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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974 the 50,000 member Illinois Education Association (lEA) 1 suffered from
a problem that plagues virtually the entire labor movement: the severe un-
derrepresentation of minority group members in union leadership positions.2 At a
time when an estimated fifteen percent of the IEA's membership was comprised of
minority group members, 3 the Association had no minority officers and no minority
members on the fifty-person board of directors.4 The IEA's representative assembly,
the 600 member "policy-forming body of the Association," 5 had only five to ten
minority members, or less than two percent.6
By 1980, however, the picture looked entirely different. One of the IEA's
principal officers was black, the board of directors was approximately fifteen percent
minority, and the representative assembly was eight percent minority.7 This remark-
able turnaround was largely the product of an affirmative action plan' voluntarily
* Associate Professor, Rutgers Law School, Camden. A.B., Cornell Univ. 1971; J.D., Harvard Law School 1975;
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 1977. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Paul
Alan Levy, Clyde W. Summers, and Marley S. Weiss, as well as those of a number of colleagues at Rutgers Law School.
1. The IEA is a not-for-profit Illinois corporation whose stated object is "to advance Public Education in Illinois
and to promote the welfare of nonmanagement school personnel." IEA BYLAWS, arts. 1, 11 (1978, amended 1982),
reprinted in part in Brief for Appellee. Appendix, Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 BYLAws]. The IEA is a state affiliate of the National Education Association (NEA), id., art. I, a
professional organization which was founded in 1857 and incorporated by special act of Congress in 1906. NEA, NEA
HANDBOOK 133 (1981-82). Over the past twenty years or so, the NEA and its state affilitates have taken on many of the
characteristics of traditional labor unions and now frequently represent teachers and other school personnel in collective
bargaining. See generally A. CReSSWE.L & M. MURPHY, TEACHERS, UNIONS, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION 53-100 (1980). The NEA's principle rival in representing teachers is the American Federation of Teachers,
AFL-CIO (AF'), and its affiliates. Many small, independent teachers' unions also are spread throughout the nation's
school systems. See id. at 26.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 40-56.
3. See infra note 171.
4. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 148 (C.D. Ill. 1981), rev'dsub nom., Donovan v. Illinois
Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
5. 1978 BYLAws, supra note 1, at art. VI, § 3.
6. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 148 (C.D. Il. 1981), rev'd sub nom., Donovan v. Illinois
Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
7. Affidavit of Reginald L. Weaver at 1, 4-5, reprinted in Brief for Appellee, Appendix, Donovan v. Illinois Educ.
Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Weaver Affidavit].
8. The United States Commission on Civil Rights has defined "affirmative action" as "active efforts that take
race, sex, and national origin into account for the purpose of remedying discrimination." U.S. COMMt'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
AFFiRMATIVE AcrION IN THE 1980s: DtsiATrs sNG THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
AFntiAa-ivE ACTION IN TIE 1980s]. An enormous body of literature exists on the subject of affirmative action. Among
the more helpful or frequently cited authorities are: N. GLAzER, AFFIRiATiVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1975); REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (B. Gross, ed. 1977); AFFmIRATIVE ACTION IN THE 1980s, supra; Bell,
Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 3 (1979); Ely, The Con-
stitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723 (1974); Freeman, Bell & McGee, Race, Class
and the Contradictions of Affirmative Action, 7 BLACK L. J. 270 (1982); Ginger, Who Needs Affirmative Action?, 14
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 265 (1979); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem
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adopted by the lEA's "overwhelmingly white" 9 1974 convention at the urging of the
Association's Minority Caucus.' 0 Designed both to remedy the underrepresentation
of minorities in IEA leadership positions and to assure that there would be "a
continuing and effective vehicle for consideration of minority information and
views" within the lEA," the plan guaranteed members of certain minority groups a
minimum percentage of seats both on the union's executive board and in the represen-
tative assembly.'
2
The lEA's affirmative action plan was remarkable not only because of its
effectiveness, but also by virtue of the fact that it was adopted at all. As one of only a
small handful of such plans ever implemented by American labor unions, 13 the IEA's
plan served as a model for other unions contemplating such plans. Equally important,
its adoption served as a precedent for minority or women's caucuses in other unions
seeking to pressure their unions into improving minority and female representation in
union leadership positions.
14
Unfortunately, the lEA's affirmative action plan was struck down by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Donovan v. Illinois Education
Association. 15 In an opinion by Judge Richard A. Posner 16 the court upheld a United
States Department of Labor challenge to the plan on the basis that the plan violated
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA or
Landrum-Griffin Act). 7 Although the court somewhat disingenuously stated that the
case did "not involve the legality of affirmative action,' 8 the lEA opinion was the
first, and to date the only, appellate decision since the Supreme Court decided United
Steelworkers v. Weber'9 to find an affirmative action plan violative of federal law.
20
of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363 (1966); Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring and Admissions: A
Jurisprudential Approach, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 534 (1975); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of
Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sop. CT. REv. 1; Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious
Remedies, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 213 (1980).
9. Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1982).
10. Weaver Affidavit, supra note 7, at 3-4.
11. Id. at4.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 141-55.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 113-28.
14. Although the IEA's affirmative action plan did not authorize any preferential treatment for women, 1978
BYLAWS, supra note 1, art. VI, §§ 1, 4, it could easily have been modified to do so had the lEA thought such action
necessary. As a teachers' union, the lEA presumably had greater representation of women in leadership positions than
unions in less traditionally female occupations, and affirmative action for women was therefore less appropriate. This
Article takes the position that when underrepresentation of women in union leadership positions has been a long-standing
problem, affirmative action for women in union government is just as appropriate as affirmative action for minority
groups. Cf. La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982) (voluntary affirmative action plan increasing employment
opportunities for women upheld); Local 35, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981) (voluntary affirmative action plan increasing employment opportunities for women
upheld); Comment, Voluntary Affirmative Action Under Title VII: Standards of Permissibility, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 281,
319-33 (1980).
15. 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
16. The IEA decision was Judge Posner's first opinion in a civil case after being elevated to the bench from his
professorship at the University of Chicago Law School in late 1981.
17. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). See infra note 129.
18. 667 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1982).
19. 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding, against a challenge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976), a voluntary affirmative action plan that reserved for blacks 50% of the openings in an
in-plant job training program).
20. Among the post-Weber cases upholding affirmative action plans are La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275 (9th
Cir. 1982); Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 662 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1981); Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs. Inc.,
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This Article will examine closely the lEA case and the court's conclusion that
virtually any affirmative action plan that reserves for minorities a percentage of a
union's elective offices violates the Landrum-Griffin Act. It will argue that while
some aspects of the Illinois Education Association's affirmative action plan were
ill-conceived, the court's conclusion was overbroad, without sound legal foundation,
and in direct conflict with the policies underlying the Act. This endeavor is worth
pursuing for several reasons. First, other unions, particularly other affiliates of the
National Education Association, 21 have adopted affirmative action plans similar to
that of the lEA, and after the lEA decision those plans are in considerable danger of
judicial attack. Second, minority and women's caucuses in many unions without
affirmative action plans will undoubtedly continue to push for the adoption of such
plans. This Article may help them respond when resistant union officials try to cut off
debate with "Gee, guys, we'd sure like to help you out, but our lawyers tell us what
you're proposing is illegal.",22 Last, in light of Judge Posner's prominence2 3 and
lEA's unique position as a post-Weber case striking down an affirmative action plan,
the case is likely to add fuel to the fires of the current anti-affirmative action
backlash.2 4 By demonstrating the flaws in Judge Posner's opinion and presenting the
658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962(8th Cir. 1981); Parker v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Local 35, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). But cf. Lehman v. Yellow Freight Sys., 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981) (upholding the
Title VII challenge of a white plaintiff to the preferential hiring of a black pursuant to a terminal manager's ad hoc,
informal hiring policy, rather than an organized affirmative action plan); Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., 616 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1980) (overturning on the basis of a state statute-and before the Supreme
Court's decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)-a school district requirement that 25% of its construc-
tion work be let to minority contractors).
21. The NEA's current bylaws require each state affiliate to "take such steps as are legally permissible to achieve
ethnic-minority representation [on its governing bodies] at least proportionate to its ethnic-minority membership." NEA
BYtAws § 8-11, in NEA, NEA HANDBOOK 160 (1981-82).
22. Admittedly, few, if any, rank and file union members read law review articles. However, the arguments raised
in this Article may reach them through their lawyers, or through such publications as the Union Democracy Review,
published by the Association for Union Democracy, Labor Notes, published by the Labor Education & Research Project,
and Labor Update, published by the Labor Committee of the National Lawyers Guild. All three of these publications have
widespread circulation among rank and file activists, and they frequently report on controversial legal issues of interest to
the rank and file.
23. See, e.g., Margolick, Ally and Foe Admire Bench Nominee, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1981, at A14, col. 1. At the
University of Chicago, Posner enjoyed a most influential academic career as one of the founders and leading advocates of
the conservative law and economics approach to the study of law and legal institutions. In addition to dozens of law review
articles which sought to apply a free market economic analysis to an astonishing range of legal issues, Posner has written
Economic Analysis of Law. (2d ed. 1977) and The Economics of Justice (1981), and was the founding editor of The Journal
of Legal Studies, ajournal designed "to encourage the application of scientific methods to the study of the legal system,"
with a principal theme being "the deep relationship between the economic and legal orders." Posner, Volume One of the
Journal of Legal Studies-An Afterwvord, 1 J. LEOAL STUD. 437, 437, 438 (1972). Posner has also been a longtime
opponent of affirmative action. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMaICS OF JUSTIcE 364-407 (1981); Posner, The Bakke Case
and the Future of "Affirmative Action," 67 CALIF. L. REv. 171 (1979); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Con-
stitutionalit ' of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
Judge Posner's opinion is worthy of scrutiny for the additional reason that he must be considered a strong candidate
for appointment to the Supreme Court. With five justices over the age of 70, President Reagan likely will have an
opportunity to make one or more additional appointments before he leaves office, and Richard Posner is young enough,
conservative enough, and qualified enough to be a leading contender for such an appointment.
24. For example, the Justice Department recently filed a brief challenging the affirmative action provisions of a Title
VII consent decree involving the New Orleans police department. See 112 L.R.RM. (BNA) 110 (Feb. 7, 1983) (News &
Background Section). In addition, the Supreme Court's recent grant of certiorari in Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679
F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982) (modifying consent decree imposing minority hiring goals to assure that seniority based layoffs
do not reduce the proportion of minority fire fighters), cert. granted sub nom., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983), raises the fear that the Court may undercut its endorsements of affirmative action in Weber
and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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arguments in support of affirmative action in union government, this Article seeks to
dampen the force of that backlash.
Before proceeding to an analysis of lEA, however, it is first appropriate to
review the status of minorities and women in the labor movement and to examine the
need for affirmative action to remedy their underrepresentation in the leadership
positions of that movement. That review is undertaken in the next part of this Article.
The subsequent part will then analyze and criticize the court's opinion in lEA and
argue that affirmative action plans similar to that of the IEA can indeed be squared
with Title IV of the LMRDA.
II. MINORITIES, WOMEN, AND UNION LEADERSHIP
A. The Status of Minorities and Women in the Labor Movement
Until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,25 labor unions were under no
legal obligation to admit minority or female members into their ranks. 26 Many un-
ions, for example, had formal prohibitions against black membership, and many
others relegated black members to auxiliary or segregated locals. 27 Even unions
without formal restrictions were able to exclude blacks or members of other minority
groups by less formal means, such as requirements that new members be sponsored
by present members, or rules allowing proposed new members to be blackballed by
the votes of only a handful of present members, or membership policies giving
preference to the relatives of present members. 28 Although exclusionary practices
were not unknown among industrial unions, 29 they were most prevalent among craft
unions, especially in the building trades, where as a general rule the unions controlled
access to work.30 "Undesirables" could easily be barred from the crafts by excluding
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
26. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959). In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), the Supreme Court had been asked
to hold that unions enjoying the statutory status of exclusive bargaining agents be required to admit blacks, but the Court
refused to so hold. Id. at 204. The Court did agree, however, that such unions have a statutory duty to represent all
members of a bargaining unit fairly, whether or not they are members of the union, and that this duty of fair representation
precludes "hostile discrimination" against black bargaining unit members. Id. For a thoughtful reexamination of Steele
and its role in the development of both labor law and civil rights law, see Klare, The Quest for lndustrial Democracy and
the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REv. 157, 185-98 (1982).
27. R. MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR 89-105 (1965). In addition to the latter work by Marshall,
other leading examinations of blacks and the labor movement include A. BLuMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE
LAW (1971); P. FoNER, OROANtzED LABOR AND THE BLACK WORKER (2d ed. 1981); W. GouLD, BLACK WORKERS IN
WHITE UNIONS (1977); 1 H. HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1977); THE NEGRO AND THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (I. Jacobson, ed. 1968).
28. R. MARSHALL, supra note 27, at 109-18.
29. Id. at 128. Most industrial unions, however, especially those organized by the Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions during the Depression, tended to accept black members much more freely. In part, this was because industrial
unions, unlike many craft unions, do not control hiring, and blacks were often well represented in mass-production
industries before unions arrived on the scene. In addition, the organizers of the industrial unions, many of whom were
socialists or communists, tended to have more progressive views on race relations than the leaders of the craft unions. See.
e.g., P. FONER, supra note 27, at 215-37; 1 H. HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSrFm,: RACE, WORK
AND THE LAW 260-73 (1977); A. MEIER & E. RUDWICK, BLACK DETROIT AND THE RISE OF THE UAW (1979). Even in
such progressive industrial unions as the United Auto Workers, however, apprenticeships for skilled jobs were often
overwhelmingly white. See W. GoULD, supra note 27, at 21, 263, 371-72.
30. R. MARSHALL, supra note 27, at 128. As the Supreme Court recently put it, "Judicial findings of exclusion from
crafts on racial grounds are so numerous as to make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice." United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 n.1 (1979).
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them from apprenticeship programs, or by rigging journeyman examinations so
minority craftsmen would fail, or by simply refusing to dispatch minority journeymen
from union-run hiring halls. 3 1 Similar restrictions were also used to keep women out
of much of the labor movement-reinforced, of course, by the psychological and
ideological message that many types of work outside the home were not appropriate
for women. 32 As late as 1974, twenty-eight national unions reported that they had no
female members. 3
3
This history of race and sex discrimination has left its mark on the present
composition of the labor movement, particularly on the numbers of minorities and
women who hold leadership positions in unions. In 1978 labor unions and employee
associations recorded about twenty million members in the United States, 34 or about
twenty percent of the civilian labor force.35 Of that number, 23.5 percent were
women, 3 6 and about eighteen percent were minorities. 37 Thus, while minorities, who
comprised approximately fifteen percent of the civilian labor force in 197838 had
become a major presence in the labor movement, 39 women, who comprised close to
forty-two percent of the civilian labor force,n ° continued to be underrepresented in
unions.
However, both minorities and women are severely underrepresented in leader-
ship positions within the labor movement. The AFL-CIO, for example, has only two
blacks and two women on its thirty-five-member executive council." Minority group
members hold the presidencies in only three of the 174 national unions in the United
31. R. MARSHALL, supra note 27, at 109. For an excellent examination of race discrimination in the construction
trades, see W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 281-362.
32. See, e.g., V. NIEVA & B. Gtr-m, WOMEN AND WORK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERsPEcrTvE 8-37 (1981); A.
SuMERs, A. FREEDtAN, M. DuNKLE & F. BLAU, EXPLOrrATION FROM 9 TO 5: REPORT OF THE TwENTmrTH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON WOMEN AND EMPLOYmr 115-21 (1975); WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 87-179 (M. Blaxall &
B. Reagan, eds. 1976); Baker & Robeson, Trade Union Reactions to Women Workers and Their Concerns, 6 CANADIAN ,
J. OF SOC. 19, 20-21 (1981). Protective legislation has also played a role in excluding women from many types of work.
Id. at 22-23.
33. Wertheimer, Leadership Training for Union Women in the United States: Route to Equal Opportunity, in EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOR Wots 227 (R. Ratner, ed. 1980).
34. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATIONS, 1979, at 55-56 (1980).
35. The total civilian labor force was approximately 102 million, of whom approximately 96 million were em-
ployed. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1982-83
376 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982-83 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
36. U.S. COMNI'N ON CIvn. RIGHTS, NONPEFERRAL UNIONS AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 1 n.5 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as NONREFERRAL UNIONS].
37. Id. at 2 nn.6-7. Of the minority group members belonging to unions, about three-fourths were black or other
racial minorities (e.g., Asian, American Indian) and about one-fourth were Hispanic. Id. at n.6.
38. Racial minority groups and Hispanics in the labor force numbered approximately 15.5 million, of whom
approximately 13.7 million were employed. 1982-83 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 35, at 376 (1982); BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMNERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT No. 328, PERSONS OF SPANISH ORIGIN IN THE
UNITED STATES: MARCH 1978, at 8.
39. The slight overrepresentation of minorities in the labor movement can probably be explained by the fact that
white males in the labor force are overrepresented in nonunion professional and managerial jobs.
40. 1982-83 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 35, at 376.
41. Telephone interview with Rex Hardesty, Assistant Director of Information, AFL-CIO (Oct. 6, 1983). Even
these figures overstate the case somewhat since one member of the executive council, Barbara Hutchinson, is a black
woman. Id.
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States, 4 2 and no women head any of the AFL-CIO's affiliate unions4 3 in spite of the
fact that women comprise at least half the membership in twenty-one different un-
ions. 44 Indeed, in 1979 women held only 4.7 percent of the 661 national offices in
unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO.45
A recent study by the United States Commission on Civil Rights of twelve of the
largest unions in this country46 found that their memberships were about fifteen
percent minority and about twenty-seven percent female, yet no minorities or women
held any of the offices of president, executive vice-president, secretary, secretary-
treasurer, or treasurer at the national level. 4 7 Of the 184 vice-presidencies, eight
percent were held by minorities, and seven percent by women.48 Minorities and
women were represented on the unions' executive boards in about the same per-
centages. 49
Minorities and women fared somewhat better in local leadership positions ex-
amined by the Civil Rights Commission,5" but they were still underrepresented.
Thirty-two percent of the bargaining unit members represented by the union locals
studied were members of minority groups, yet only twenty-seven percent of the local
offices were held by minorities. 5 1 Much smaller percentages of local presidencies or
vice-presidencies were held by minorities. 52 Similarly, thirty-seven percent of the
bargaining unit members were women, yet only twenty-three percent of the local
offices were held by women. 53 Again, women held an even smaller percentage of the
top local offices. 54 Few unions omitted from the Civil Rights Commission's study
42. These are Cesar Chavez of the United Farm Workers of America, Frederick O'Neal of the Associated Actors and
Artistes of America, id., and significantly, Mary Hatwood Futrell, a black woman who was recently elected president of
the National Education Association. See Maeroff, Energetic Leader for Teachers' Union, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1933, at
A14, col. 2.
43. Although the National Education Association is now led by a woman, it is not affiliated with the AFL-CIO.
44. Wertheimer, supra note 33, at 227. For example, women constitute 80% of the International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union and 61% of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Unions. NONRFERRAL UNIONS, supra note
36, at 14.
45. NONREFERRAL UNIONS, supra note 36, at 13. A special convention of the Communications Workers of America,
which has never had a woman elected to national office even though a majority of its members are women, recently
rejected a proposal to create a fourth vice-presidency, with the "hope and expectation" that a woman would be elected to
fill the position. Only 26% of the convention's delegates were women. 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 281, 283 (1933) (News &
Background Section).
46. The study focused on the 12 largest private sector, nonreferral unions. Nonreferral unions are those that have
little direct influence on hiring, that is, unions that do not regularly refer members to jobs through union operated hiring
halls. With a combined membership of over 10 million in 1978, the unions included in the study were the Teamsters, Auto
Workers, Steelworkers, Machinists, Electrical Workers (IBEW), Retail Clerks, Clothing and Textile Workers, Com-
munications Workers, Service Employees, Meat Cutters, Ladies' Garment Workers, and Hotel and Restaurant Em-
ployees. NoNREFERuAL UNIONS, supra note 36, at iv-v. It should be noted that many Teamsters and Electrical Workers
locals operate hiring halls.
47. Id. at 14-15.
48. Id. at 15.
49. Id.
50. The Commission's study included an examination of 77 locals, randomly selected from among the locals
affiliated with the 12 international unions covered by the study. Id. at 8.
51. Id. at 18.
52. Id. at 23-25. See also Lamm, Black Union Leaders at the Local Level, 14 INDUS. REL. 220, 231 (1975)
(reporting that blacks were underrepresented among local union leaders in two-thirds of a sampling of local unions with
black members in the San Francisco Bay area).
53. NONREFERRAL UNtONS, supra note 36, at 18.
54. Id. at 23-25.
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have a significantly better record in their representation of minorities and women in
leadership positions, 55 and many have a much worse record.
56
B. The Need for Increased Representation of Minorities and Women in Union
Leadership Positions
The simple fact that minorities and women are underrepresented in union leader-
ship positions does not by itself explain the need for their increased representation.
There are at least five major reasons why many unions might find it advantageous to
have greater numbers of minority and female members emerge in leadership roles: 1)
to enable unions to better represent their minority and female members; 2) to improve
the quality of union leadership; 3) to enhance union performance in organizing
minority and women workers; 4) to avoid liability in employment discrimination
suits; and 5) to preserve labor peace.
1. Better Representation of Minorities and Women
The most important reason for increasing the representation of minorities and
women in union leadership positions is also the most obvious: to enable unions to
better represent their minority and female members. Although a union's duty of fair
representation may not obligate it to seek increased representation of minorities and
women in leadership positions, 57 a major purpose of that doctrine-to assure minorit-
ies "the right to have their interests considered at the conference table'' 5 8 -would
certainly be advanced by such efforts. It is possible, of course, that a union leadership
dominated by white males is capable of representing minority and women members.
It is more likely, however, that the presence of black and women union leaders would
make that task easier and enable the union to carry out its responsibilities more
55. One union that has had an exemplary record of racially integrated leadership is the United Packinghouse
Workers, which merged with the Amalgamated Meat Cutters in 1968. See W. GouLD, supra note 27, at 400-05; 1 H.
HI.L, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYsTEM 270-73 (1977).
56. Among the worst are many of the building trades unions. See generally UNrrED STATES COMM'N ON CtVIL
RIrrHTS, THE CHALLENGE AHEAD: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN REFERRAL UNIONS 33-36 (1976); W. GOULD, supra note 27,
at 281-362.
57. It is well settled, of course, that unions have a statutory duty to represent fairly all the workers for whom they
serve as exclusive bargaining agents, including minorities and women. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957);
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See generally, Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under
the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977). Indeed, with regard to
minority workers, this duty became even more significant after the Supreme Court's decision in Emporium Capwell Co.
v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975), which limited the right of minority union members to engage
in concerted activity on their own in efforts to improve their working conditions and, specifically, to end employment
discrimination. See generally, Cantor, Dissident Worker Action, After The Emporium, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 35 (1975).
Unfortunately, this duty of fair representation has proven to be a disappointing vehicle for remedying discrimination
by unions, see, e.g., W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 37-38; 163-77; 1 H. HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYsrzit 162-69 (1977), and it is difficult to argue that the doctrine requires unions to increase minority and female
representation in leadership positions. Indeed, the Steele case itself, which engendered the fair representation doctrine at
the same time it upheld a union's right to exclude blacks from membership, see supra note 26, seemed to endorse a model
of "fair representation without participation." Kiare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against
Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REv. 157, 190 (1982).
58. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 200 (1944).
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effectively.5 9 As the United States Commission on Civil Rights has pointed out,
"Without increased representation within the union leadership, the problems of
women and minorities may be overshadowed by the interests and concerns of the
majority. "60
When a union's contract proposals are formulated in preparation for collective
bargaining, the presence of women and minorities among the union's officers could
affect both the content of those proposals and their ranking in priority order.
"Women's demands," such as employer-provided child care, or "minority de-
mands," such as job training programs, may become high priorities that otherwise
might not even have been considered. Another illustration can be found in the
negotiation of seniority provisions in collective bargaining agreements. The duty of
fair representation doctrine affords unions an extremely wide range of discretion in
negotiating seniority systems, 61 and recent decisions under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act even permit unions to negotiate seniority systems that perpetuate the
effects of past discrimination. 62 Minorities and women who are shortchanged by such
seniority systems, therefore, have no remedy in the courts. Their only hope is to
prevail upon their unions to modify those seniority systems so that discriminatory
effects are minimized. It may be unrealistic to expect many mostly white or mostly
male unions to negotiate seniority provisions that significantly undermine the in-
terests of their white or male members. Nevertheless, adjustments often could be
made to improve the seniority of minorities or women without undercutting the
positions of large numbers of whites or males. 6 3 The presence in union leadership
positions of minorities and women, who would probably be more sensitive to the
needs of the minority and female members of the union and more willing to push for
those needs, would in all likelihood increase the prospects of such developments
taking place.
Having minorities and women in union office can benefit those constituencies in
a wide range of other areas short of contract negotiation. Grievance handling is
perhaps the most important. Many collective bargaining agreements, for example,
have provisions prohibiting race and sex discrimination.' A woman who is a victim
of sexual harassment on the job, however,. may fear that her grievance will not be
taken seriously when the union's leadership lacks women in whom she can confide.
59. Cf. Rosenbloom & Featherstonhaugh, Passive and Active Representation in the Federal Service: A Comparison
of Blacks and Whites, 57 Soc. Sci. Q. 873 (1977) (arguing that black public servants are more likely than whites to be
able to articulate values and perspectives associated with blacks as a group); Note, Race as an Employment Qualification
to Meet Police Department Operational Needs, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 413 (1979) (arguing that police departments should be
able to hire preferentially because increased numbers of black police officers are necessary to overcome hostility towards
police in black communities).
60. NONREFERRAL UNIONS, supra note 36, at 26. See also UNITED STATES CO%tst'N ON CIVIL RtoHTS, THE
CHALLENGE AHEAD: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN REFERRAL UNIONS 31 (1976); W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 130.
61. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
62. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
63. See Newman & Wilson, The Union Role in Affirmative Action, 32 LAB. L.J. 323, 328 (1981) (reporting such
steps taken by the International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers); W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 384-87
(describing an inverse seniority system proposed by the United Auto Workers).
64. One survey found that approximately 84% of a sampling of 400 representative collective bargaining agreements
contained such provisions. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 111 (9th ed. 1979).
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Similarly, one study has shown that black workers tend to seek out black officials to
handle their grievances even when the grievances are not race related. 65
Minority and female union officials can also help improve employment oppor-
tunities for workers of their race or gender. In unions that regularly refer members to
employers "the potential for [discrimination against blacks] is limited when blacks
are aware of employment opportunities because of the elected positions they hold.
They can both check possible abuses by the white leadership and suggest blacks as
qualified applicants." 66 Even in nonreferral industries minority union leaders can
often use their positions to assist others in getting jobs. 6 7 In addition, they can help
uncover and remedy any discriminatory employment practices their members may
face on the job. 68 Closer to home, employment opportunities for minorities and
women within the union itself are probably enhanced when minorities and women are
among the union's elected leadership.
69
2. Improved Quality of Union Leadership
Many unions may wish to see increased numbers of minority and women offi-
cers because it benefits not only the unions' minority and female membership, but
also the rest of their membership by improving the quality of union leadership as a
whole. In cases where long patterns of underrepresentation have resulted from the
prejudiced voting practices of white, male majorities, or from other institutional
forces, 70 the union's pool of leadership talent has been artificially reduced, to the
detriment of the entire membership. 7 1
Moreover, a union's minority or female membership may actually be more
qualified for union leadership than its white male members. For example, one study
suggests that at least in unions that represent low pay, low status workers, minority
members on the average often have better character, reliability, intelligence, and
other leadership qualities than white workers. This is a result of employment dis-
crimination: "[T]he same jobs which select the pick of the Negro workforce [because
they have difficulty finding better jobs] . . . are likely to select marginal members of
the white workforce [since better whites can get better jobs]. "72
65. See Lamm, supra note 52, at 229. Cf. Rosenbloom & Featherstonhaugh, Passive and Active Representation in
the Federal Service: A Comparison of Blacks and Whites, 57 Soc. Sci. Q. 873 (1977); Note, Race as an Employment
Qualification to Meet Police Department Operational Needs, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 413 (1979).
66. W. GouoD, supra note 27, at 133.
67. According to one study:
Increasing employment opportunity for blacks has been a major side activity of black union leaders.... One
autoworker commented, 'I use my rapport with the establishment to get employment and promotions for
others. .. .' In the steelworkers' plant the black co-chairman of the grievance committee not only made
demands for black foremen but brought to the attention of top management that the front office's clerical pool
should be integrated. One black business representative, with a good perspective of the entire organization, tried
to guide blacks to those jobs offering the greatest promotion possibilities.
Lamm, supra note 52, at 229-30.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 82-93.
69. See S. GREE, LAST MAN IN: RACtAL AccEss TO UNION PowER 65 (1959).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 98-112.
71. See Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A JurisprudentialLegal Critique, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
503, 528 (1982); Ginger, Who Needs Affirmative Action?, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 265, 270-75 (1979).
72. S. GEER, LAST MAN IN: RAcLAL AccEss TO UrnON POWER 51 (1959).
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3. Enhanced Performance in Organizing Minority and Women Workers
In recent years union memberships in this country have been declining in both
absolute and relative terms. 73 Whereas in 1960 23.6 percent of the workforce was
unionized, by 1980 the figure had dropped to 20.8 percent. 74 Moreover, unions won
only 45.7 percent of the representation elections conducted by the National Labor
Relations Board in 1980, compared to sixty-one percent in 1966.75 The labor move-
ment is under tremendous pressure, therefore, to improve the effectiveness of its
efforts at organizing the unorganized. For many unions one step in that direction
would be to increase the numbers of minorities and women in union leadership
positions.
Women, for example, comprise an unusually high percentage of the employees
in such traditionally nonunion industries as banking, insurance, and hospital and
health care, which have only recently become the targets of extensive union organiz-
ing efforts. 76 Clerical and secretarial jobs of all types are overwhelmingly held by
women, and recent efforts to organize such workers have been heavily influenced by
the women's movement. 77 Unions attempting to organize women in these traditional-
ly female, nonunion occupations have to persuade these employees that the unions
are changing with the times and are capable of responding to the special needs of
women workers. Unions with relatively high percentages of women in leadership
positions will obviously be more effective at winning the confidence of women
workers than unions dominated by the stereotypical cigar-chomping white male.
Similarly, unions seeking to organize industries with high percentages of
minorities in the workforce will probably meet with greater success if significant
numbers of minorities hold union office. 7 8 This was a concern of the Illinois Educa-
tion Association, for example, when it adopted its affirmative action plan. As a
spokesman for the Association stated, "[M]inority representation in governance and
leadership was essential for organizing the potential membership of the state associa-
tion among communities served by minority teachers or containing a large minority
school population."-
79
These factors may be particularly important when two or more rival unions are
competing for the loyalties of the same workers. When large numbers of women or
minorities are in the work force targeted for organizing, the union with more women
or minorities among its leaders is likely to have an advantage. Actions may speak
louder than words when it comes to persuading female or minority employees that
73. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 1981, at 253 (1982).
74. See id.; BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 1979, at 237 (1980).
75. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 1981, at 262 (1982); BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 1967, at 414 (1968).
76. See Vertheimer, supra note 33, at 227-28.
77. See Koziara & Insley, Organizing Low Income Women in New Ways: Who, Where, and Why, in INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS RESEARCH Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING 381, 386 (1981).
78. Cf. Rosenbloom & Featherstonhaugh, Passive and Active Representation in the Federal Service: A Comparison
of Blacks and Whites, 57 Soc. Sc. Q. 873 (1977); Note, Race as an Employment Qualification to Meet Police
Department Operational Needs, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 413 (1979).
79. Weaver Affidavit, supra note 7, at 4.
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one union will be more responsive to their needs than another.80 Indeed, this was
perhaps a factor in the decision of the Illinois Education Association to adopt its
affirmative action plan since its chief rival, the American Federation of Teachers,
may have alienated many potential minority members by vigorously opposing com-
munity control of schools, which in urban areas often means minority control, and
affirmative action.
8 1
4. Avoiding Liability in Employment Discrimination Suits
As the partners of employers in collective bargaining, unions are often held
jointly liable with employers for negotiating contract provisions that have a dis-
criminatory purpose or effect.8 2 The very enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196483 reflected on the part of Congress "a profound distrust of events taking
place across the bargaining table." 84 The duty not to discriminate that Title VII
places on unions is a strict one, and some courts have imposed liability on unions for
failing to negotiate actively at the bargaining table for the elimination of an employ-
er's discriminatory practices.
8 5
Unions can reduce or eliminate potential Title VII liability, however, by taking
good faith steps to eliminate employment discrimination.8 6 Unions that wish to
pursue this course are usually in an excellent position to do so. Union members
"have intimate, firsthand knowledge of plant practices," 8 7 and both the NLRB and
the courts have upheld the right of unions to obtain information from employers on
hiring, promotion, and job classification broken down by race, sex, and national
origin. 88 When unions are unable to obtain the results they seek at the bargaining
table, they can combine this information with their legal expertise and financial
resources to assist employees in bringing their own Title VII actions. 89
80. Although inflammatory appeals to racial prejudice have no place in a representation election campaign, it is
perfectly appropriate for unions to discuss their positions on racial matters. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
81. In 1968, for example, the American Federation of Teachers' New York City affiliate waged a bitter and racially
divisive strike in which a key issue was the union's opposition to community control. See Zeluck, The UFT Strike: A Blow
Against Teacher Unionism; and Shanker & Hill, Black Protest, Union Democracy and the UFT, in AUrocRACY AND
INSURGENCY IN ORGANIZED LABOR 201,218 (B. Hall, ed. 1972). The AFT also filed an amicus brief opposing affirmative
action in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978). The NEA, in contrast, has repeatedly
reaffirmed its support for affirmative action. See Maeroff. N.E.A. in Support of Minority Hiring, N.Y. Times, July 6,
1983, at A13, col. 1. The NEA's progressive stand on affirmative action can be explained in part by its merger in 1966
with the American Teachers Organization, a smaller, predominantly black group. Brief for Appellant at 24, Donovan v.
Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
82. See, e.g., Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 365-66 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935
(1976); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1381-82 (5th Cir. 1974).
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
84. W. GouLD, supra note 27, at 262.
85. See, e.g., Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., 478
F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see Thornton v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1974). See generally
Note, Union Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARv. L. REv. 702 (1980); Comment, Tile Union as Title VII
Plaintiff. Affirmative Obligation to Litigate?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1388 (1978).
86. See, e.g., Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 458 F. Supp. 474,502-03 (E.D. Va. 1978), affd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
87. AFFiRmATivE ACnroN IN THE 1980s, supra note 8, at 33.
88. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 106 (1978), enfd, 648 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
89. See generally Newman & Wilson, The Union Role in Affirmative Action, 32 LAB. L.J. 323 (1981).
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This program is more likely to be followed when minorities and women are well
represented in union leadership, for the same reasons that unions with minorities and
women in their leadership are generally more responsive to the needs of those con-
stituencies. 90 Indeed, the first recommendation to labor unions in a recent Civil
Rights Commission report was to "establish procedures to increase the representation
of minorities and women in union leadership positions," for without such increased
representation "discrimination by an employer may continue largely un-
challenged." 91 Moreover, when particular unions or their industries have had an
historical record of discrimination, it will be more difficult for unions to free them-
selves of potential Title VII liability. An important factor in doing so, however, may
be
the existence of proof that it is integrating, or making substantial efforts toward integrat-
ing, its own leadership positions at both the international and local levels. Where blacks
constitute a particularly significant percentage of a union's membership, this aspect of the
union's record ought to be scrutinized with the greatest of care if there are few or no
blacks at leadership level. The leadership's activities are critical here since, despite the
protestations about the democratic nature of unions and the fact that the rank and file
ultimately determine the vote, it is normally the "slate" sponsored by the leadership, on
either a formal or an informal basis, which emerges successful from the electoral pro-
cess.
92
The presence of women and minorities in union leadership positions can protect
unions from liability for employment discrimination in still another way. An em-
ployee seeking to remedy discrimination has the choice of suing both the employer
and the union together, or one or the other alone. Where only the employer is sued, a
recent Supreme Court decision precludes the employer from forcing the union to
contribute toward any back pay award. 9 3 A minority or female employee is more
likely to sue the employer alone, leaving the union immune from liability, where he
or she more closely identifies with the union because of the women and minorities
who hold office within the union.
5. Preserving Labor Peace
Finally, the increased presence of minorities and women in union leadership
positions can help promote one of the fundamental objectives of federal labor
policy-the preservation of labor peace. 94 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, for
example, the auto industry was rocked by waves of wildcat strikes, many of which
began as protests by black workers against employment discrimination. 95 If blacks
90. See supra'text accompanying notes 57-69.
91. NONREFERRAL UNIONS, supra note 36, at 93.
92. W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 263.
93. Northwest Airlines v. Transportation Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
94. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 151 (1976).
95. See W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 388-95; C. DENBY, INDIGNANT HEARI. A BLACK voRKER's JOURNAL
262-81 (1978). Wildcat strikes led by black caucuses occurred in other unions as well, such as the Amalgamated Transit
Union. See W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 422. In addition, protests by black workers' organizations against discrimination
by building trades unions shut down construction sites in several cities. Id. at 303, 308, 338-40, 350.
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had been better represented in the leadership of the United Auto Workers at that
time, 96 the union might have been more aware of the growing discontent of its black
members and more inclined to explore efforts to resolve their grievances before
tensions reached the breaking point. Moreover, a union leadership containing more
blacks would probably have been more successful at keeping the strikes short and
inhibiting their spread.9 7
C. The Need for Affirmative Action to Bring About Increased Representation of
Minorities and Women in Union Leadership Positions
It is one thing for a union to recognize the advantages of greater representation
of minorities and women in the union's leadership and quite another to achieve that
goal. A variety of obstacles impede the election of more minorities and women to
union office, and in many cases, they can be overcome only with the help of affirma-
tive action. One of the most basic obstacles is old-fashioned bigotry and prejudice on
the part of white, male majorities. It is probably true, on the one hand, that the
achievements of the civil rights and women's movements in the last two decades have
lessened to some degree overt racism and sexism. On the other hand, the sheer
number of day-to-day occurrences of racially or sexually motivated harassment,
hostility, and even brutality makes it impossible to pretend that bigotry and prejudice
do not influence some proportion of the votes cast in the elections of union officers .98
This prejudice, however, tends to be less prevalent among union leaders than among
the rank and file. 9 9 In many unions, therefore, it might be possible for a relatively
progressive union leadership to shepherd through a state or national convention
constitutional changes guaranteeing minority group members and women more repre-
sentation in elective office, whereas without these guarantees, a less progressive rank
and file would fail to vote minorities and women into office in the same numbers. 0 0
96. Blacks comprise 25 to 30% of the UAW's membership, but in 1968 blacks were employed in only 7.5% of the
union's staff positions. W. GouLD, supra note 27, at 391. As late as 1979, minorities comprised 42% of the membership
of UAW locals examined by the Civil Rights Commission, but held only 29% of the locals' top offices. No NRFERRAL
UNtONS, supra note 36, at 23.
97. Cf. Note, Race as an Employment Qualification to Meet Police Department Operational Needs, 54 N.Y.U. L.
REy. 413 (1979). It is not suggested, on the other hand, that the mere presence of blacks in union office, without more,
will eliminate the conditions which have led to wildcat strikes in the past. See W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 394.
98. Cf. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 (1977) ("[Vloting for or against a candidate because of his
race is an unfortunate practice. But it is not rare .... )
99. See D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERicAN COMMUNrrY 134 (1970).
100. This scenario is plausible because in most unions a very high percentage of delegates to state and national
conventions are union officials and staff, often loyal to, or subject to political pressure from, the statewide or national
leadership. Thus, a union's leadership may be able to win approval of an affirmative action plan at a convention, when
such approval might not be possible through a referendum vote of the rank and file. Of course, the greater the gap between
the leadership and the rank and file in their views on minorities and women holding union office, the less likely it will be
that union leaders will jeopardize their own elected positions to push through an unpopular affirmative action plan. Cf. id.
where that gap is not overwhelming, on the other hand, the leadership's own position would probably not be at risk even
if they did advocate reforms beyond those the rank and file would adopt. In part, this may be because they are performing
to the satisfaction of the rank and file in other areas of concern, and in part, it may be a simple result of the advantages of
incumbency, which make it exceedingly difficult for the rank and file to turn out of office national, and to a lesser degree,
state union officials. See generally James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in National
Union Elections, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 247 (1978).
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Even when overt hostility toward minority or female candidates for office is not
a major problem, many more subtle or institutionalized factors may place those
candidates at a competitive disadvantage.' 0 ' Several studies have found, for ex-
ample, that the elected officers of union locals tend to have three things in common:
they were generally among the higher paid and more skilled workers represented by
the local; they usually had more seniority, both within the plant and within the union
than other workers; and they frequently had jobs that enabled them to move around
the plant and talk to other workers-high status jobs that tend to go to more senior
and more skilled workers.'o 2 Because of past and continuing discrimination in em-
ployment and in job training opportunities, both minorities and women tend to be
underrepresented in better paying, skilled jobs. Moreoever, when they do hold these
positions, they tend to be more recent hires with less seniority.'0 3 In addition, women
who interrupt their careers to have children are even less likely to acquire substantial
seniority. 104
Beyond these structural obstacles potential minority and women candidates for
union office face a number of psychological barriers to winning office. For example,
in unions in which few minorities or women have held office before, both minorities
and women often lack the self-confidence needed to break new ground. As one study
found:
The median number of years of education for black union leaders today is above what
white union leaders have traditionally had .... Despite their education, blacks frequently
displayed little self-confidence. Many applicants for the union leadership training pro-
gram already had the qualifications needed for union leadership. These applicants,
however, often commented that they had not sought office because they did not have
"enough experience." Most of the shortcomings cited were skills most incumbents learn
while in office, such as knowledge of labor law or negotiation tactics. To become a
steward in most locals takes no more than a desire to serve, yet one respondent com-
mented, "I'm not yet qualified to run. When I do, I'll run for steward. The members
prefer older experienced men, and they are all white." The general lack of self-confidence
is part of a black's belief that to succeed he must not be just equally qualified but
overqualified. '0 5
101. As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has found:
Race, sex and national origin discrimination are not relics of the past existing solely as isolated acts of
prejudice in an almost colorblind and gender-neutral society. The discrimination that minorities and women
experience is far more pervasive, entrenched, and varied then many of the critics of affirmative action assume.
Such discrimination will not yield to remedies that are premised on ignoring its existence.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1980s, supra note 8, at 5.
102. See L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, THE LOCAL UNION 80-81 (rev. ed. 1967); S. GREER, LAST MAN IN: RACIAL
ACCESS TO UNION PowER 59 (1965); Koziara & Pierson, Barriers to Women Becoming Union Leaders, in INDUS'RIAL
RELATIONS RESEARCH Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEEnNG 48, 52 (1980).
103. This point is illustrated by the fact that in times of economic recession women and minority workers are laid off
with greater frequency than their white male counterparts. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1983);
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983); see generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED: LAYOFFS AND
CIVIL RIGHTS (1977).
104. See Koziam & Pierson, supra note 102, at 48, 52. Working mothers with substantial responsibilities in the
home often lack the time necessary to participate actively in union affairs and are often further discouraged from doing so
because of the lack of child care at most union meetings. Baker & Robeson, Trade Union Reactions to Women Workers
and Their Concerns, 6 CANADIAN J. OF SOC. 19, 28 (1981).
105. Lamm, supra note 52, at 225-26.
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The same lack of confidence can affect potential women candidates to an even greater
extent since union office is traditionally perceived as a "male" job, and "people
typically have less confidence performing tasks generally associated with the op-
posite sex." 1
06
Psychological factors also affect the voting patterns of the electorate. Many
union members who are not consciously hostile to minority or female candidates may
perceive these candidates in terms of stereotypes associated with race or gender. For
example, women tend to be stereotyped as less aggressive, competitive, and in-
telligent than men.' 0 7 Since these characteristics are commonly associated with
negotiating skill, union members who do not see beyond these stereotypes will tend
to prefer male candidates for union office.10 8 In small locals, particularly those
confined to a single workplace, group stereotypes may play a lesser role in union
elections since a large percentage of the electorate will know the candidates per-
sonally and be able to judge them on their individual qualities rather than on group
stereotypes. In large, diversified locals, however, and in elections conducted on a
regional, state, or nationwide basis, a much smaller percentage of the electorate will
know the candidates personally. The votes of many will all too often be influenced by
stereotypes. '09 Moreover, even union members who do not themselves accept the
traditional stereotypes of minorities and women may discriminate against them be-
cause they believe such candidates will not be treated as equals by management
personnel who are predominantly white and male. " 0
The experience of several United Auto Workers locals in Detroit suggests that in
order for minority and female candidates to overcome these obstacles, minorities or
women would often have to comprise as much as forty-five percent of a union's
membership."' Moreover, in unions in which historically minorities and women
have been underrepresented in office those candidates will usually be outsiders
challenging incumbent officeholders and will be confronted with all the additional-
and usually quite substantial-obstacles challengers often face in union elections. 112
Without some form of institutionalized affirmative action program to help minority
and women candidates overcome these barriers, these groups will undoubtedly re-
main underrepresented in most unions for a long time to come.
106. Koziara & Pierson, supra note 102, at 51.
107. Id. at 50.
108. Id. Cf. Feldman-Summers, Montano, Kasprzyk & Wagner, Influence Attempts When Competing Views Are
Gender-Related: Sex as Credibility, 5 PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN Q. 311 (1980).
109. Koziara & Pierson, supra note 102, at 50. See Lamm, supra note 52, at 223.
110. Koziara & Pierson, supra note 102, at 50.
111. See W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 394.
112. See generally James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in National Union
Elections, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 247 (1978). Even when a particular incumbent is not running for reelection,
entrenched political machines within unions often select the members of the winning slate. See W. GOULD, supra note 27,
at 263; Lamm, supra note 52, at 223. Of course, where the incumbent leadership chooses to include minority or female
candidates on their slate, those candidates would ordinarily be at a distinct advantage. But see W. GOULD, supra note 27,
at 399 (black candidates endorsed by white leadership may be rejected by black voters as "Uncle Toms").
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D. IEA's Antecedents: Prior Efforts to Remedy Minority and Female
Underrepresentation in Union Office
When even top officials of a union with one of the best records in fighting race
and sex discrimination refer to goals, quotas, and preferential treatment as "an-
athema to the industrial relations world," 113 it is not surprising that few unions have
adopted affirmative action plans to remedy the underrepresentation of minorities and
women in union office. Nevertheless, the Illinois Education Association's decision to
adopt such a plan in 1974 was not without precedent. Moreover, in light of the
growing presence of minority and women's caucuses in many unions, symbolized at
the national level by the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists 1 4 and the Coalition of
Labor Union Women,' 15 other unions may well join the lEA's ranks if not deterred
by the lEA decision.
The union with the longest and best record of assuring minorities significant
representation in union leadership positions is the United Packinghouse Workers of
America (UPWA), which merged with the Amalgamated Meat Cutters in 1968. As
far back as the 1940's the UPWA leadership explicitly demanded that blacks be
proportionately represented on the union's executive board, which resulted in blacks
holding four of thirteen seats on the board. The national leadership also encouraged,
and when necessary required, UPWA locals to include minorities in their leadership.
In 1948, for example, eighty-three percent of the UPWA's locals had blacks in key
positions. Not coincidently, the UPWA had one of the best records of any union in
fighting for equal employment opportunities for minorities. 116 Indeed, one of its first
collective bargaining agreements with a major Chicago meat packing company re-
quired the company to hire blacks in proportion to their numbers in Chicago's pop-
ulation. 117
Another union that guarantees blacks representation in its national leadership is
the United Furniture Workers of America (UFWA), whose membership is thirty
percent minority. In a constitutional amendment strikingly like that adopted by the
Illinois Education Association in 1974,118 the UFWA's 1970 convention enlarged the
union's executive board from twenty-seven to thirty-one members by adding four
vice-presidents, who were expected to be black. 19 As one UFWA vice-president
remarked, "We can't permit racism to parade under the banner of democracy."'
120
Information about efforts to increase minority or female representation in union
leadership at the local level is sparse, but at least two studies have identified locals
that require proportional representation of minorities on committees or on the local's
113. Newman & Wilson, The Union Role in Affirmative Action, 32 LAB. L.J. 323, 325 (1981). The authors were
General Counsel and Associate General Counsel of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers.
114. See P. FONER, supra note 27, at 431-33; W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 364-65.
115. See 2 P. FONER, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MovEMENT 514-36 (1980); Wertheimer, supra note 33,
at 237-38.
116. See W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 402.
117. D. BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 98 (1980).
118. See infra note 141.
119. See W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 407.
120. Quoted in id.
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full-time staff.12 ' In general, unions seem somewhat more receptive to affirmative
action when it affects staff positions rather than elective offices. 122 Within the AFL-
CIO the head of the Industrial Union Department recently pledged that at least half of
all new organizers hired by the Department would be women. 123 The AFL-CIO also
had to resort to preferential treatment to provide women with their first representative
on the AFL-CIO's Executive Council-Joyce Miller, a vice-president of the Amalga-
mated Clothing and Textile Workers and president of the Coalition of Labor Union
Women. In order to elect Miller the Council had to waive its rules that a member be a
chief officer of a union and that there be no more than one representative from a
single union on the Council.124
Until the lEA case the courts had generally not been involved, one way or the
other, with union efforts to increase the numbers of minorities or women holding
union office. A major exception, however, was a line of cases dealing with the
mergers of union locals previously segregated by race. In a number of these cases the
courts approved temporary, transitional agreements under which the members of each
local covered by the merger were to receive a proportional allocation of executive
board seats and convention delegate positions to prevent the numerically smaller
racial group from being excluded from office. 25 Unfortunately, after the expiration
of the transitional agreements, minority officeholders were often voted out by the
white majority and replaced with whites. 126
One case, however, struck down a merger agreement that permanently allocated
all of the defendant union's offices on racial grounds. In that decision, Schultz v.
121. S. GREER. LAST MAN IN: RACIAL AccEss TO UNION POWER 64 (1959); Lamm, supra note 52, at 230.
122. Preferential appointment of minorities or women to union staff positions is easier to accomplish than the
adoption of affirmative action plans guaranteeing minorities and women greater representation in elective office because it
usually does not necessitate amendments to union constitutions or bylaws. Moreover, this kind of affirmative action is less
threatening to incumbent elected officials because they obviously have greater control over who is selected for appointive
office. Efforts on the part of elected officials to appoint more minorities and women to staffjobs should be encouraged for
all the reasons more minorities and women are needed in elective office. See supra text accompanying notes 57-97. Such
appointments are not subject to challenge under Title IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act, which regulates the selection of
elected officials only. If accomplished by means consistent with United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979),
affirmative action in appointments should survive any challenges brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 274-95. However, affirmative action in staff
appointments can never be a complete substitute for affirmative action in elective office when conditions warrant it. After
all, true power and policy making authority are vested in a union's elected leadership, not the appointed staff. Moreover,
appointed staff serve only at the pleasure of the officers who appoint them, and as a practical matter they generally have
little freedom to disagree with the decisions and policies of those officers without jeopardizing their jobs. See, e.g.,
Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431 (1982). See generally Levy, Legal Responses to Rank-and-File Dissent: Restrictions on
Union Officer Autonomy, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 663, 679-705 (1981).
123. See 2 P. FONER, WOMIEN AND THE AmERICAN LABOR MovEtErr 569 (1979).
124. Developments in Industrial Relations: First Woman on AFL-CIO Executive Council, MOTHLY LAB. REV.,
Oct. 1980, at 53.
125. See. e.g., Fluker v. Locals 265 and 940, United Papermakers, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 92 (S.D. Ala.
1972); English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 904 (S.D. Ga.), affdas modified, 465 F.2d
43 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) , 7637 (E.D. Va. 1971),
vacated in part on other grounds, 471 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); Hicks v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 310 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. La. 1970). See also Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 455 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972)
(holding that transitional measures were not warranted by facts before the court, but recognizing they may be a "useful
tool" in other cases). See generally W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 129-35, 416-19.
126. See W. GOULD, supra note 27, at 130.
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Local 1291, International Longshoremen's Association,127 the court invoked the
same provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act as were relied on by the Seventh Circuit
in lEA, and not surprisingly the Longshoremen case was favorably cited by Judge
Posner in his lEA opinion. 128 The next part of this Article will argue that the lEA
court's reliance on Longshoremen was misplaced and that it is possible to design an
affirmative action plan promoting increased representation of minorities and women
in union government that will not violate the Landrum-Griffin Act.
III. THE lEA DECISION AND TITLE IV OF THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN Act:
HALF RIGHT FOR THE WRONG REASONS
A. The District Court Proceedings
The lEA case did not begin as a challenge to the Illinois Education Association's
affirmative action plan. Instead, it began in 1977 when a member of the Association
complained to the United States Department of Labor that the Association had vio-
lated Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act12 9 by appoint-
ing, rather than electing, the Association's secretary-treasurer. 130 The litigation that
followed 131 ultimately resulted in April 1980 in a stipulation providing that an elec-
127. 338 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Pa.), affd per curiam sub nom. Hodgson v. Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1262 (3d Cir. 1972). Longshoremen will be discussed in greater detail infra at text accompanying notes
263-72.
128. 667 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1982).
129. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (1976). The LMRDA was enacted in 1959 following two years of widely publicized
hearings on union corruption conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Manage-
ment Field (the McClellan Committee). The Act was at the time of its passage, and remains today, the principal federal
legislation regulating internal union affairs. The aim of the Act's five substantive titles was to eliminate or reduce union
corruption through the promotion of union democracy. See infra text accompanying notes 212-20.
Title I of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1976)-the "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations"-protects
union members' civil liberties within unions, such as the right to equal treatment, freedom of speech and assembly, and
protection against improper disciplinary action. Title II of the Act, id. §§ 431-41, imposes reporting and disclosure
requirements on unions and union officers, and Title III, id. §§ 461-66, establishes limits on the power of national or
international labor organizations to impose trusteeships on their affiliates. Title IV of the LMRDA, id. §§ 481-83. upon
which the lEA case was based, regulates the conduct of elections of union officers, and Title V of the Act, id. §§ 501-04.
defines and provides for the enforcement of the fiduciary responsibilities of union officers. The remaining two titles of the
LMRDA contain miscellaneous provisions relating to the administration and enforcement of the act, id. §§ 521-3 1. and
amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, codified in scattered sections of Title 29 of the United States Code. See
generally J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN Acr: TwErY YEARS OF FEDERAL PROTEcTON OF
UNtION MEMBERS' RIrs (1979); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MItC.
L. REV. 819 (1960); Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 Moo. L. REv. 273 (1962). For an
excellent introduction to the LMRDA written for laymen, see H. BENSON, DIEtOCRATIC Rtrrs FOR UNION MEMBERS
(1979).
130. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 145 (C.D. I11. 1981), rev'd sub norn., Donovan v. Illinois
Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982). The section of the Act allegedly violated was 401(d). 29 U.S.C. § 481(d)
(1976), which requires "intermediate" labor organizations, including statewide organizations such as the lEA-as
opposed to local organizations, on the one hand, or national and international organizations, on the other--to elect their
officers not less than every four years. A key issue in the case was whether the secretary-treasurer was an 'officer" for
purposes of section 401(d). On October 10, 1978, in an unpublished opinion the district court ruled that it was. See
Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 145 (C.D. II1. 1981), rev'd sub nom., Donovan v. Illinois Educ.
Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982). Another key issue was whether the IEA was a labor organization in fact covered by
the Act. The lEA eventually conceded it was. See id.
131. A complaint was filed in the name of the Secretary of Labor on September 30, 1977, in the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 145 (C.D. III. 1981).
rev'd sub nom., Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982). With the exception of certain types of
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tion for secretary-treasurer was to be held under the supervision of the Department of
Labor. 132
Unfortunately, the parties were unable to agree on the terms of the stipulated
election. 133 Ordinarily, union elections supervised by the Department are to be, "so
far as lawful and practicable, in conformity with the constitution and bylaws of the
labor organization." 134 The Department, however, contended that certain provisions
of the lEA bylaws affecting the election were unlawful and should therefore be
disregarded in the election. 135 Those provisions involved the IEA's affirmative action
plan. The parties agreed in their stipulation to submit to the district court, on briefs
and affidavits, the question of the bylaws' validity, and hence, the validity of the
affirmative action plan. 136
According to the EA's bylaws, the Association's executive officers, who by
1980 were deemed to include the secretary-treasurer, 137 were to be elected "by a
majority vote of the delegates to the Annual Meeting of the Representative
Assembly.' ' 138 The representative assembly, comprised of delegates to the IEA's
annual convention, is "the policy-forming body of the Association" 139 in which,
along with the organization's board of directors, "[t]he governance of the Associa-
tion is vested.'
140
The Department of Labor's objections to the lEA's bylaws focused on the
affirmative action plan, which guaranteed members of four minority groups at least
eight percent of the seats in the IEA's representative assembly and on its board of
directors. 141 The Department contended that this plan violated section 401(e) of the
preelection suits not relevant to the lEA litigation, enforcement of the LMRDA's election provisions lies exclusively in the
hands of the Department of Labor, pursuant to § 402 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1976). See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379
U.S. 134, 140 (1964). Complaining union members do, however, have the right to intervene in litigation filed by the
Department as a result of their complaints. Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528 (1972). In lEA the original complainant did
not intervene.
132. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 145-46 (C.D. I11. 1981), rer'd sub non., Donovan v.
Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
133. Id. at 146.
134. LMRDA § 402(c), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1976).
135. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 146 (C.D. I11. 1981), rev'd sub noni., Donovan v. Illinois
Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
136. Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1982).
137. The bylaws in effect when lEA was decided provided for only two executive officers, a president and a
vice-president. 1978 BYLAWs, supra note 1, art. IV. Pursuant to the district court's 1978 ruling, see supra note 130, and
the parties' stipulation, however, the secretary-treasurer position was also considered an executive office. The IEA's
current bylaws expressly designate the secretary-treasurer as an executive officer. IEA BYLAWS art. V, in IEA, BYLAWS,
REsOLUriONS, AND NEv BUSINESS 1982-83 (1982). The secretary-treasurer's duties include acting as secretary to the
representative assembly, board of directors, and executive committee, and serving as the Association's chief fiscal officer.
Id.
138. 1978 BYLAws, supra note 1, art. IV, § 2(C).
139. Id. art. Vi, § 3.
140. Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 1982). Between meetings of the representative
assembly, governance of the Association rests with the organization's executive officers, board of directors, and executive
committee. 1978 BYLAWS, supra note 1, arts. IV, § 5; VII, § 5; VIII, § 5.
141. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 146 (C.D. I11. 1981), rev'dsub nom., Donovan v. Illinois
Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982). The four groups were blacks, Asians, hispanics, and American Indians. 1978
BYLAws, supra note 1, art. VI, §§ 1, 4. The IEA's affirmative action plan did not authorize any preferential treatment for
women. The original version of the plan, which was drafted by the IEA's Minority Caucus, sought to guarantee for
minorities 20% of the seats in the representative assembly. Weaver Affidavit, supra note 7, at 3-4. That figure was
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LMRDA, which requires that "every member in good standing shall be eligible to be
a candidate and to hold office (subject to ... reasonable qualifications uniformly
imposed)." 142 If the composition of the representative assembly were flawed because
borrowed from the then existing bylaws of the NEA. Id. The NEA's current bylaws require each state affiliate to "take
such steps as are legally permissible to achieve ethnic-minority representation [on its governing bodies] at least pro-
portionate to its ethnic-minority membership." NEA BYLAWs, § 8-11, in NEA, NEA HANDBOOK 160 (1981-82).
Article VI of the IEA's 1978 bylaws, which dealt with the representative assembly, provided in part as follows:
ARTICLE VI-REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY
Section 1-Composition
A. Delegates-The delegates to the Representative Assembly shall be:
1. Regional Delegates
2. Board of Directors Members
3. Student Member Delegates
4. One delegate selected by each state affiliate
6. [sic] At Large Ethnic/Minority Delegates
B. Non-Voting Participants-Non-voting participants are members of committee, as determined by the
Board of Directors, who shall be restricted to making motions and speaking to issues pertaining to the purpose of
the committee.
Section 4-Regional Allocation and Election
E. Election of Delegates
1. The membership of each chartered local education association shall elect their allotted Representative
Assembly delegates and alternates by secret ballot.
2. The Representative Assembly shall contain no less than 8% Ethnic/Minority delegates. In the event a
minimum of 8% Ethnic/Minority delegates are not elected from chartered local education associations, the
Board of Directors and the Ethnic/Minority Caucus shall develop a plan to ensure 8% representation. Ethnic/
Minority shall mean those persons designated as Ethnic/Minority by statistics published by the United States
Bureau of the Census. This designation shall specifically include Blacks, Mexican-American (Chicano), other
Latino-culture groups, Orientals, and Indians.
1978 BYLAws, supra note I, art. VI.
Article VII of the bylaws, which deals with the IEA's board of directors, provided in part as follows:
ARTICLE VII-BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Section 1-Composition
The Board of Directors shall be composed of:
A. The President and Vice-President of the Association.
B. The chairperson of each Regional Council and in case of absence the Vice-Chairperson of each
Regional Council.
C. The N.E.A. Directors.
D. A representative of S.I.E.A. except that seat shall be without portfolio if membership in S.I.E.A. is
determined by the Board to have fallen below 1000 members.
E. For the purpose of Ethnic/Minority representation, the state shall be divided into four geographical
sections established by the Board of Directors. The members within each section shall elect by open nomination
and secret ballot one Ethnic/Minority representative and alternate.
These elections shall be conducted at a time and in a manner prescribed by the Board of Directors.
Id., art. VII.
142. Section 401(e) provides in relevant part:
In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret ballot a reasonable opportunity shall be
given for the nomination of candidates and every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and
to hold office (subject to section 504 and to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) and shall have the
right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or candidates of his choice, without being subject to penalty,
discipline, or improper interference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1976). Section 504 of the LMRDA prohibits Communists and persons who have been convicted of
certain crimes from holding union office for five years after leaving the Communist Party or after conviction or completion
of imprisonment for the designated crimes. Id. § 504(a). (The restrictions on Communists holding union office were
declared unconstitutional in U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965)).
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of the operation of the allegedly unlawful affirmative action plan, it would follow,
according to the Department's argument, that the election of a secretary-treasurer by
this improperly composed representative assembly would itself be unlawful. 143
The issue squarely presented to the district court, therefore, was whether the
affirmative action plan incorporated into the LEA's bylaws violated section 401(e) of
the Landrum-Griffin Act." More specifically, the question was whether the Asso-
ciation's setting aside of positions for minorities on the representative assembly and
board of directors imposed unreasonable limitations on the rights of other union
members to be candidates for those positions pursuant to section 401(e) of the Act.
The district court held that it did not. 1
45
Before reaching that decision, however, the court reviewed the background of
the IEA's adoption of the plan in 1974-particularly the underrepresentation of
minorities in union office at that time' 4 6 -and described the plan's operation.' 47
According to Article VI of the EA's 1978 bylaws,148 delegates to the representative
assembly are initially elected in the traditional manner with no special procedures to
assure the election of minority delegates.' 4 9 If minority group members win eight
percent or more of the seats in the assembly, no further steps are taken. On the other
hand, if fewer than eight percent of the delegates elected in this fashion are minori-
ties, the bylaws provide that "the Board of Directors and the Ethnic/Minority Caucus
shall develop a plan to ensure 8% representation. '"' 50 The plan adopted for that
purpose calls for the representative assembly to be expanded in size by adding as
many "ethnic-minority add-on delegates" as necessary to bring the percentage of
minority delegates up to the required eight percent. 15 These "add-on" delegates
would be nominated and voted on by the board of directors.
152
The IEA's affirmative action plan also guaranteed minority groups at least eight
percent of the seats on the lEA's board of directors. 153 The amendment added four
new positions to the board, each to be filled by a minority group member elected by
the IEA members in one of four geographical regions into which the IEA divided the
state. 154 These four minority positions were in addition to any positions on the board
that minority group members might obtain in the normal fashion. 155 The legality of
this part of the IEA's affirmative action plan, however, was not explicitly addressed
143. See Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1982).
144. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 146 (C.D. Il. 1981).
145. Id. at 148-49. The district court judge was J. Waldo Ackerman.
146. Id. at 148. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
147. 511 F. Supp. 144, 148 (C.D. 11. 1981).
148. See supra note 141.
149. 511 F. Supp. 144, 148 (C.D. 111. 1981). Most of the approximately 600 delegates are elected by the member-
ship of the IEA's various regional and local affiliates. About 50 of the delegates are members of the IEA's board of
directors, who for the most part are also elected by the IEA's membership. See supra note 141.
150. 1978 BYLAwS, supra note 1, art. VI, § 4(E)(2). See supra note 141.
151. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 148 (C.D. 111. 1981), rev'dsub nom., Donovan v. Illinois
Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 1978 BYLAws, supra note 1, art. VII, § I(E). See supra note 141.
155. Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 1982).
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by the district court since the board of directors had no direct role in selecting the
secretary-treasurer. 1
56
In reaching the merits the district court recognized that nonminority members of
the IEA were not eligible to become add-on delegates to the representative
assembly. 157 Nevertheless, the court held that the plan satisfied the "reasonable
qualifications" exception to the LMRDA's requirement that all union members be
eligible to run for and hold union office. 158 According to the court, the plan was "not
unduly restrictive" in the sense that "large numbers of union members are unable to
run for union office." 159 Moreover, the plan did "not result in the abuses of en-
trenched leadership" at which the LMRDA was aimed. On the contrary, the plan
"beneficially effect[ed] the free and democratic processes of union government in
making the union more responsive to its membership. ' 160 The affirmative action
plan served a legitimate purpose, which, the court remarked, "might not be attained
in any manner less destructive of other legally protected interests.' ' 61  Finally, the
court noted that, as a voluntary affirmative action plan that was temporary in
nature, 162 the union's plan was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
United Steelworkers v. Weber. 163 The district court then ordered the Department of
Labor to apply the IEA's bylaws, as amended in 1974, to the stipulated election of the
IEA's secretary-treasurer.'
64
B. The Seventh Circuit's Decision
The Department of Labor appealed the district court's order, and a unanimous
panel of the Seventh Circuit in an opinion by Judge Posner reversed the district court
on January 4, 1982.165 After resolving an IEA procedural objection to the Depart-
ment of Labor's position,166 the court held that the IEA's affirmative action plan
156. But see infra note 166 (last paragraph).
157. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 148 (C.D. II1. 1981), rev'dsub nom., Donovan v. Illinois
Edue. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
158. Id. at 148-49. See supra note 142.
159. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 148 (C.D. I11. 1981), rev'dsub nom., Donovan v. Illinois
Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 148-49.
162. No add-on delegates would be necessary once the ordinary election process resulted in the election of enough
minority delegates to satisfy the eight percent goal. Id. at 149. See supra text accompanying note 149.
163. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See supra note 19.
164. Marshall v. Illinois Edue. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 149 (C.D. III. 1981), rev'dsub nom., Donovan v. Illinois
Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
165. Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982). Also on the panel were Chief Judge Walter J.
Cummings and Judge Robert A. Sprecher.
166. The lEA argued that the government's challenge to its affirmative action plan was not appropriate because the
Department of Labor had failed to satisfy the prerequisites that are an integral part of Title IV's enforcement scheme.
Section 402 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1976), provides that the principal remedies for violations of § 401 are a
declaration that the election is void and an order directing that a new election be conducted under the supervision of the
Department of Labor. However, to spare unnecessary expense and to avoid undue governmental interference with internal
union affairs, see infra text accompanying notes 227-28, those remedies may be imposed only if the alleged violation of
§ 401 "may have affected the outcome of an election." LMRDA § 402(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c)(2) (1976). (The
principal exceptions to this rule, regarding access to and fair use of unions' membership lists for campaign purposes, id. §
401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c), and challenges to discriminatory applications of union election rules, were not relevant to the
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violated the requirement of section 401(e) that all union members be eligible to run
for union office.' 67 The opinion emphasized that the reasonable qualifications excep-
tion, relied on by the district court,168 should be narrowly construed,' 69 and pointed
out that no recent decisions interpreting the provision had upheld qualifications for
office that prevented a majority of the union's membership from running for
office. 170 Since in the court's view the IEA's affirmative action plan precluded at
least eighty-five percent 17  of the membership from running "for any of the posi-
lEA litigation. See, e.g., Crowley v. Local 82, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983)).
In this case, according to the IEA's argument, not only had the stipulated election for secretary-treasurer not yet taken
place, but it was sheer speculation for the Department of Labor or the court to conclude that the allegedly improper
affirmative action plan would have affected the outcome of the election. Brief for Appellee at 43-46, Donovan v. Illinois
Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982). For example, if minority add-on delegates comprised four percent of the
representative assembly, and the winning candidate for secretary-treasurer won by a 20% margin, it would be difficult to
conclude that the presence of the add-on delegates affected the outcome of the election. Indeed, the Department of Labor
had been asked by its original complainant in IEA to challenge the IEA's 1977 presidential and vice-presidential elections,
but it declined to do so because "the number of minority [add-on] delegates who voted at the 1977 convention ... were
not sufficient to have affected the outcome." Id. at 45 n.27. If the Department could not mount a direct assault on the
IEA's affirmative action plan in its initial complaint, argued the Association, it should not be permitted to succeed in an
indirect assault through its supervision of the stipulated election. Id. at 45.
At least for purposes of the Department's challenge to the composition of the representative assembly, the court
correctly rejected this procedural argument. As Judge Posner's opinion points out, 667 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1982), the
Act explicitly provides that union elections conducted under the Department's supervision must be "in accordance with
the provisions of this title," LMRDA § 402(b), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1976), and shall be held in conformity with the
union's own bylaws only "so far as lawful and practicable." Id. at § 402(c), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c). It would be anomalous,
and certainly wasteful, to construe Title IV's remedial provisions in such a way that the Department of Labor would have
to supervise an election with full knowledge that the procedures being followed were unlawful, when upon completion,
that election itself would be subject to challenge in a whole new set of Title IV enforcement proceedings. See Trbovich v.
UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 537 n.8 (1972); Millwrights Local 1914 v. Carroll, 654 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1981); Brennan v. Local
639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 494 F.2d 1092, 1098-1100 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Commentators on the LMRDA have long
contended that as it is, Title IV's enforcement procedures are too cumbersome and the Department of Labor is too passive
in its enforcement efforts. E.g., J. BELLACE & A. BERKowrrz, THE LANDRUNM-GRIFFIN Acr: TwENTY YEARS OF FEDERAL
PROTECTION OF UNION MEMBERS' RIGHTS 280-82 (1979); H. BENSON, DEMtocRATic RIGHTS FOR UNION MEMBERS
91-122 (1979); D. McLAUGHUN & A. ScoOOMAKER, THE LANDRUm-GRIFFIN AcT AND UNION DESIOcRAcy 43-73
(1979); Hall, Meanwhile, Back at the Labor Department, in ATrrocRACY AND INSURGENCY IN ORGANiZED LABOR 267 (B.
Hall, ed. 1972); James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in National Union Elections, 13
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 247, 293-325 (1978); Rauh, LMRDA-Enforce It or Repeal It, 5 GA. L. REV. 673 (1971);
Note, Union Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE L.J. 407, 489-544, 567-68 (1972);
Note, The Election Labyrinth: An Inquiry into Title IV of the LMRDA, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 336, 380-86 (1968). A ruling
on procedural grounds that avoided the merits of the Department's argument regarding the minority add-on delegates to
the representative assembly would have been a serious setback for the effective enforcement of Title IV.
On the other hand, the court of appeals acknowledged that "[tihe question is somewhat less clear with regard to [the
Department's challenge concerning] membership on the Board of Directors." Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d
638, 640 (7th Cir. 1982). Nevertheless, the court entertained that challenge since the candidates for secretary-treasurer
were to be "nominated by a Nominating Committee composed of members of the Board of Directors.... [I]f the
Board's composition is tainted by an unlawful by-law the election could be tainted as well." Id. Even if the board's
composition were in fact tainted, arguably the court should not have reached the merits of the Department's challenge to
Article VII of the IEA's bylaws, given the remoteness of any effect on the election for secretary-treasurer (the board
members holding the positions reserved for minorities might not even be on the nominating committee).
167. 667 F.2d 638, 641, 642 (7th Cir. 1982). See supra note 142.
168. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 148-49 (C.D. I1. 1981). See supra text accompanying
notes 157-61.
169. 667 F.2d 638, 641 (citing Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 309 (1977), and Wirtz v.
Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 499 (1968)).
170. Id.
171. The lEA did not have accurate records of its overall racial composition. It was the largest teachers' organization
in the state, however, and statistics kept by the state indicated that 15% of all Illinois teachers were minorities. See
Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 148 (C.D. Ill. 1981), rev'd sub nom., Donovan v. Illinois Educ.
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tions ... reserved for members of [minority] groups," it followed that the plan
violated section 401(e). 172
A second problem with the IEA's affirmative action plan was discussed only in
dictum-the manner in which the minority add-on delegates to the representative
assembly were chosen when these delegates were needed to reach the eight percent
goal. 173 Under the IEA's plan, the add-on delegates were nominated and elected by
the Association's board of directors. 174 By permitting the board of directors to name
up to eight percent of the delegates to the representative assembly, which in turn
elects some members of the board, including the IEA's executive officers, the plan
"presents one of the specific dangers, that of self-perpetuating incumbency, which
the election provisions of the LMRDA were designed to cure.' ' 175
Finally, after noting that the court "did not assume that there is no set of facts
that could possibly justify" an affirmative action plan similar to the LEA's, 17 6 Judge
Posner's opinion outlined additional problems with the plan and the arguments ad-
vanced in its support. For example, Judge Posner complained, "[a]part from two
perfunctory affidavits" containing only "vague generalities," no evidence was in-
troduced to show how the Association had benefited from the restrictions. 177 Nor was
there any evidence of past discrimination against minority teachers by the IEA for
which the affirmative action plan would be "mak[ing] amends or head[ing] off
complaints." 178 The court also questioned the basis for including Asians and Amer-
ican Indians as beneficiaries of the affirmative action plan and excluding "other
groups that might be equally plausible candidates for favor." 179 And in concluding,
the opinion declared irrelevant the fact that the lEA's affirmative action plan had been
adopted by an "overwhelmingly white" membership. 180
Stripped of its dicta, Judge Posner's opinion for the Seventh Circuit held that
both aspects of the IEA's affirmative action plan-the use of add-on delegates in the
representative assembly and the addition of four special minority seats to the board of
directors-violated section 401(e) of the Landrum-Griffin Act because they unrea-
sonably denied a majority of union members the right to run for those positions.
Further analysis reveals that Judge Posner's opinion was half-right-with respect to
the illegality of the appointment of add-on delegates to the representative assembly-
Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982). Although Judge Posner's opinion suggests that the minority composition of the IEA
might have been far less than 15%, 667 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1982), the Department of Labor itself came close to
conceding the reasonableness of the figure. Brief for Appellant at 9 n.5, Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638
(7th Cir. 1982).
172. 667 F.2d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 1982).
173. Id.
174. See supra text accompanying note 152.
175. 667 F.2d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S.
492, 499 (1968)). The opinion noted that this particular danger was not present in the bylaws providing for the addition for
four minority positions on the board of directors, since candidates for those positions were elected by the membership of
the union. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 640.
179. Id. at 642.
180. Id.
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but for the wrong reasons. In fact, the plan violated section 401(d) of the LMRDA,
not section 401(e).
C. Section 401(d) and the Appointment of Add-On Delegates
Section 401(d) of the Landrum-Griffin Act is the same provision upon which the
Department of Labor originally based its complaint in the district court pro-
ceedings. 181 It requires "intermediate" labor organizations' 82 to elect their officers at
least every four years "by secret ballot among the members ... or by labor organ-
ization officers representative of such members who have been elected by secret
ballot.", 1
83
Although the Department's complaint originally invoked section 401(d) in order
to compel the EEA to elect rather than appoint its secretary-treasurer, 84 the provision
is equally applicable to the selection of representative assembly delegates. The pro-
vision's application in this context derives from its application to the selection of
executive officers such as secretary-treasurer. Since one of the duties of the represen-
tative assembly is to elect the IEA's executive officers, 185 delegates to the assembly
must be "elected by secret ballot" under the terms of the section. 8 6 This language
has been construed to mean secret ballot vote of the members.' 87 Thus, the selection
of minority add-on delegates by the board of directors, rather than by secret ballot of
the membership, was a clear violation of section 401(d) which the court of appeals
did not rely upon in its decision.' 88 Indeed, it would seem that the IEA's procedures
for electing its executive officers would have been open to challenge on 401(d)
grounds even if there had been no affirmative action plan and no minority add-on
181. See supra note 130.
182. The lEA is an intermediate body for purposes of § 401(d) in the sense that it falls between the national or
international level, at which elections of officers must be held at least every five years, LMRDA § 401(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 481(a) (1976), and the local level, at which elections of officers must be held at least every three years. Id. § 401(b), 29
U.S.C. § 481(b).
183. Section 401(d) provides:
Officers of intermediate bodies, such as general committees, system boards, joint boards, orjoint councils,
shall be elected not less often than once every four years by secret ballot among the members in good standing or
by labor organization officers representative of such members who have been elected by secret ballot.
29 U.S.C. § 481(d) (1976).
184. See supra text accompanying note 130.
185. See supra text accompanying note 138.
186. LMRDA § 401(d), 29 U.S.C. § 481(d) (1976).
187. Although if read literally, the words of section 401(d) could arguably be construed to permit the secret ballot
election of delegates by the board of directors, rather than by the membership itself, Department of Labor regulations
construe the provision to require the election of such delegates by "the members.., of the labor organization." 29
C.F.R. § 452.22 (1983) (emphasis added). See also Donovan v. District Council 35, Int'l Bhd. of Painters, 702 F.2d 25
(1st Cir. 1983). Any other interpretation would undercut one of the purposes of Title IV, which is "to leave the choice of
leaders to the membership." Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 312 (1977). Members of the board
of directors already serve as delegates to the representative assembly, and the representative assembly already elects a
good portion of the board of directors (in addition to the executive officers, the NEA Directors). See 1978 BYLAws, supra
note 1, art. V, § 1; art. V, § 1. To allow the board of directors to elect other delegates to the assembly would further close
the circle, leaving the membership on the outside.
188. The Department of Labor had mentioned this argument in its brief, but it did not stress it. Brief for Appellant at
21 n.13, Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982). Judge Posner's opinion invoked the policies
behind the § 401(d) argument when it pointed out the dangers of "self-perpetuating incumbency" posed by the lEA's
plan, Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 1982), but the opinion never mentioned § 401(d) in
this context, much less relied on it.
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delegates since other members of the representative assembly, such as the executive
officers and the NEA directors, were elected by the board of directors rather than by
the membership directly.'
89
Thus, to the extent the IEA's affirmative action plan depended on the appoint-
ment of add-on delegates to the representative assembly by the board of directors, it
ran afoul of section 401(d). However, if the IEA had amended its bylaws to provide
for the election of the add-on delegates by the membership, those bylaws would not
have violated that section. In the alternative, add-on delegates or other delegates
appointed by the board of directors could have been granted full voting rights in the
representative assembly for all purposes except the election of executive officers. 19
0
On the other hand, because the IEA's bylaws concerning the board of directors
already provided for the four additional minority members of the board of directors to
be elected directly by the membership,' 9' that aspect of the IEA's affirmative action
plan did not violate section 401(d). Whether either phase of the plan violated section
401(e), as the circuit court held, is, however, another question entirely.
D. Section 401(e) and the "Reasonable Qualifications" Exception
The heart of Judge Posner's opinion in lEA is its conclusion, based on section
401(e) of the Act,' 92 that the IEA's affirmative action plan imposed unreasonable and
unduly restrictive limitations on the right of nonminority IEA members to run for the
positions set aside for minorities under the affirmative action plan. 193 The actual
language of the provision offers little guidance for evaluating the court's construction
of section 401(e) since the key words, "reasonable qualifications," are nowhere
defined in either the statute or its legislative history. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has long "cautioned against a literal reading of congressional labor legislation" and
emphasized the need in statutory construction to examine "the general objectives
Congress sought to achieve." 194 Unfortunately, the court's opinion fails to utilize the
189. See supra note 187.
190. With the arguable exception of § 101(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3)(B) (1976), dealing with the power of
convention delegates to raise dues, nothing in the LMRDA requires convention delegates to be directly elected by a
union's membership for any purposes other than the election of officers. This alternative, of course, would have undercut
to some extent the effectiveness of the affirmative action plan.
191. See 1978 BYLAws, supra note 1, art. VII, § I(E). See supra note 141.
192. See supra note 142.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 167-72. A threshold question not explicitly addressed by either the district
court or the court of appeals was whether the positions set aside for minorities in the representative assembly were even
subject to the requirements of § 401(e), whatever they might be. As the IEA had argued, Brief for Appellee at 25 n.10,
Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982), members of the representative assembly--essentially
convention delegates-do not seem to fit the definition of "officer" provided in § 3(n) of the Act: "'Officer' means any
constitutional officer, any person authorized to perform the functions of president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, or
other executive functions . . ., and any member of [the] executive board or similar governing body." 29 U.S.C. § 402(n)
(1976). However, § 401(e) does not apply only to the election of union officers. It applies to "any election required by this
section which is to be held by secret ballot." Id. § 481 (e) (emphasis added). And since § 401 (d) requires election by secret
ballot of any convention delegates who elect the officers of intermediate labor organizations such as the IEA, the
requirements of § 401(e) were properly invoked. See 29 C.F.R. § 452.22 (1983); Donovan v. District Council 35, Int'l
Bhd. of Painters, 702 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1983).
194. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968). This is especially true of the
Landrum-Griffin Act:
"The legislation contains more than its share of problems forjudicial interpretation because much of the bill was
written on the floor of the Senate or House ... and because many sections contain calculated ambiguities or
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LMRDA's legislative history as an aid in determining the congressional objectives
behind section 401(e). 195 Instead, the opinion applies the reasoning of several
Supreme Court precedents in a mechanical, formalistic manner that reveals funda-
mental misunderstanding of both those cases and the actual operation of the IEA's
affirmative action plan.
1. The Court's Reliance on Hotel Employees and Steelworkers
The principal cases relied on by the Seventh Circuit in lEA were Wirtz v. Hotel,
Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6196 and Local 3489, United Steelworkers v.
Usery.' 97 In both cases the Supreme Court was called upon to construe the reasonable
qualifications exception to section 401(e). In Hotel Employees the union required
candidates for major union office to have previously held elective office within the
union. Operationally, the requirement made ninety-three percent of the union's
membership ineligible to run for the offices in question. 198 In Steelworkers the union
required candidates for local union office to have attended at least half of the local's
meetings over the preceding three years. The requirement had the effect of barring
96.5 percent of the local's membership from running for office. 199 The Supreme
Court held the qualifications in each case to be unreasonable restrictions on the rights
of union members to run for office.
2° °
As the leading cases construing the reasonable qualifications exception, 20 1 Hotel
Employees and Steelworkers were obviously appropriate sources of authority.
political compromises essential to secure a majority. Consequently, in resolving them the courts would be well
advised to seek out the underlying rationale without placing great emphasis upon close construction of the
words."
Id. at 468 n.6 (quoting Cox. Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REv.
819, 852 (1960)). Although in some statutory areas the Court has tended in recent years to emphasize the literal words of
statutes at the expense of more general indications of legislative purpose, see Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the
Common Law: Statutory Interpetation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 892 (1982), when construing the
Landrum-Griffin Act, the Court has continued to avoid undue reliance on the text of the Act and to stress the need to "look
to the objectives Congress sought to achieve." United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982). This
approach was endorsed by the Seventh Circuit only a few weeks before the lEA decision was issued: "Where ... a
situation occurs which Congress did not contemplate in enacting the LMRDA, the statute is to be construed in light of the
objectives Congress sought to achieve." Marshall v. Local 1010, United Steelworkers, 664 F.2d 144, 150 (7th Cir.
1981).
195. The opinion's only direct reference to the LMRDA's legislative history cites remarks by Representative
Landrum, one of the Act's sponsors, to the effect that "Congress did not want to legislate with respect to the racial
practices ... of unions." Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing 105 CONG. REc.
15826 (1959)). Representative Landrum's statement responded to the fears of some southern congressmen that the
LMRDA might require unions to admit blacks. That requirement was not imposed on unions by federal law until the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976). Indeed, if the passage quoted has any relevance
to the lEA dispute at all, it would seem to cut against the court's repudiation of the IEA's affirmative action plan, which
could be characterized as a "racial practice" of the union.
196. 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
197. 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
198. 391 U.S. 492, 502 (1968).
199. 429 U.S. 305, 310 (1977). In most unions, only I to 10% of the membership regularly attend membership
meetings. Attendance is much higher, of course, at meetings held to ratify proposed contracts, elect officers, call strikes,
and so forth. See W. LEisERsoN, AMRICAN TRADE UNION D aiocAcy 285-86 (1959); L. SAYLEs & G. STRAuss, THE
LOCAL UNION 97-98 (rev. ed. 1967).
200. 391 U.S. 492, 505 (1968); 429 U.S. 305, 312-13 (1977).
201. Besides Hotel Employees and Steelworkers, the only cases dealing with qualifications for union office to reach
the Supreme Court were Hodgson v. Local 6799, United Steelworkers, 403 U.S. 333 (1971), and Wirtz v. Local 153,
Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463 (1968), which involved meeting attendance requirements similar to that struck
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However, the court's opinion virtually ignored their discussions of section 401(e)'s
legislative purpose 20 2 and instead concentrated on their facts. In Hotel Employees and
Steelworkers the central, and possibly controlling,20 3 factor was that the union rules
in question "substantially deplete[d] the ranks of those who might run in opposition
to incumbents."-20 4 Indeed, according to Justice Powell, the Court in Steelworkers
came close to establishing a per se rule prohibiting any eligibility requirement that
had the effect of disqualifying "all but a small percentage of the union's
membership."- 20 5 Judge Posner's approach in lEA was to characterize the operation
of the IEA's affirmative action plan so that it seemed to fall within the per se rule
described by Justice Powell.
The critical flaw in Judge Posner's reasoning was to consider the positions
reserved for minorities as delegates to the representative assembly and as members of
the board of directors to be offices separate and distinct from the remaining positions
in the assembly or on the board. From this perspective, it would seem to follow that
"the vast majority" of the IEA's members, as in Hotel Employees and Steelworkers,
were prevented from running for offices covered by section 401 .206 But in fact, the
eight percent of the positions reserved for minorities under the IEA's bylaws were
identical in every way, except for their manner of selection, with the remaining
ninety-two percent of the positions.20 7 Thus, the IEA's plan barred absolutely no
nonminority members from running for any of the roughly 600 preexisting positions
in the representative assembly or fifty preexisting positions on the board of di-
rectors. 20 8 While the creation of new minority positions may have diluted slightly the
down in Steelworkers. In Local 6799, however, the issue before the court concerned the exhaustion of internal union
remedies, and in Glass Bottle Blowers the issue was whether the particular dispute was then moot. In neither case did the
Court reach the merits of the challenged eligibility requirement. Among the more significant cases in the courts of appeals
dealing with the reasonable qualifications exceptions are Colpo v. Local 326, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 659 F.2d 399 (3d
Cir. 1981) (union's disqualification of candidate for failing to pay dues continuously for 24 months held unreasonable
where problem was caused by employer's failure to comply with dues check-off agreement); Usery v. District 22, UMW,
543 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1976) (requirement that candidates for district office be nominated by at least five different locals
in the district held unreasonable); Brennan v. Independent Lift Truck Builders Union, 490 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974) (until
propriety of employee's discharge is resolved, union member who is actively contesting his discharge cannot be barred
from candidacy on the grounds that he is not working in the trade); Hodgson v. Local 18, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
440 F.2d 485 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971) (requirement that union member transfer to parent local and
pay transfer fee as prerequisite to candidacy held unreasonable where rule makes over 60% of membership ineligible to
run for office).
202. See infra text accompanying notes 212-18.
203. See Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 315 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
204. 391 U.S. 492, 499 (1968). See also Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 310 (1977):
Like the bylaw in Hotel Employees, an attendance requirement that results in the exclusion of 96.5% of the
members of candidacy for union office hardly seems to be a 'reasonable qualification' consistent with the goal of
free and democratic elections. A requirement having that result obviously severely restricts the free choice of the
membership in selecting its leaders.
205. Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 315 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
206. Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 1982).
207. The IEA's bylaws treat minority add-on delegates to the representative assembly and minority members of the
board of directors the same as nonminority delegates and board members with regard to powers, duties, voting rights, and
so forth. See 1978 BYLAws, supra note 1, arts. VI, VII; and supra note 141.
208. In fact, the addition of four minority seats to the board of directors could actually increase nonminority group
members' chances of being elected to the board since some potential minority group candidates may choose to run for the
minority seats, when otherwise they might have competed for the same seats as nonminority candidates. This result is not
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value of each nonminority delegate's or board member's vote, that is far from Judge
Posner's conclusion that the IEA's plan prevented a majority of the union's member-
ship from running for office.
20 9
2. Title 1V's Legislative Purpose
To argue that the IEA's affirmative action plan does not violate the per se rule of
Steelworkers, of course, does not end the inquiry. It cannot be denied that, at least for
a small number of delegate and board member positions, a majority of union mem-
bers is barred from candidacy. The initial question, therefore, remains to be an-
swered: Are these restrictions on the rights of nonminority IEA members to be
candidates for the positions reserved for minorities reasonable within the meaning of
section 401(e)? Since Congress nowhere defined "reasonable qualifications," the
meaning of those words must be derived from Congress' intent in enacting section
401(e).2 10 That question, as Justice White recently stated, "is best answered by
identifying the problem that Congress intended to solve by adopting the pro-
vision." 2 11
The LMRDA was enacted to help alleviate two serious and related problems
within the labor movement:2 12 the corruption and racketeering that had been exposed
by the McClellan Committee hearings, 2 13 and the autocracy and lack of democracy
as paradoxical as it may seem. Dean Derrick Bell has argued that many remedies for racial discrimination have benefited
whites as much, if not more, than minorities:
[United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)] is a prime example of the often overlooked benefit to
whites of affirmative action programs. Remember that the Kaiser Aluminum Company had steadfastly refused
union pressures in the collective bargaining process for the initiation of a training program for unskilled
workers. Kaiser initiated such a program under the threat of litigation by the civil rights agencies. When they did
establish a program, it was 50% black and 50% white. But whites ignored the benefits for which Blacks had
worked and focused on the asserted violation of seniority rules that were necessary to enable black workers to
meaningfully participate in the program.
Freeman, Bell & McGee, Race, Class and the Contradictions of Affirmative Action, 7 BLAcK L.J. 270, 275 (1982). See
also Bell. Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 3, 14-16 (1979); cf.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGOsrS, AFiRMAnTiVE ACTION IN THE 1980s, supra note 8, at 36.
209. 667 F.2d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 1982). Indeed, as Justice Powell stated in an analogous context, "Mhe effect of
the set-aside is limited and so widely disbursed that its use is consistent with fundamental fairess." Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 515 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (upholding a federal program setting aside for minority
contractors 10% of the contracts in local public works projects financed with federal monies).
210. See supra text accompanying note 194.
211. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 121-22 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
212. See Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MicH. L. REV. 819, 820
(1960). Professor Cox also mentions a third source of pressure leading to the passage of the LMRDA: organizations
representing employers "whose primary object appears to have been to use the outcry against corruption within labor
unions as an occasion for revising labor-management relations laws in a manner which would weaken the unions." Id. at
820-21. While this pressure may have affected the language of Title IV, it was more specifically directed at Title VII of
the LMRDA, which amended the National Labor Relations Act to curb secondary boycotts and certain types of recog-
nitional picketing. LMRDA § 704, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (7) (1976).
213. The McClellan Committee, formally known as the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the
Labor or Management Field, held extensive hearings during 1957 and 1958 investigating corrupt practices in a number of
unions, but with a distinct emphasis on Jimmy Hoffa's Teamsters, the largest union in the country. See J. BELLACE & A.
BERKowTZ, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN Acr. TwENTY YEARS OF FEDERAL PROTECTION OF UNION MEMBERS' RIGHTs 2-4
(1979). The record of the Committee's proceedings filled 58 volumes, and the Committee published interim reports of its
findings and recommendations in 1958 and 1959, and a final report in 1960. The 1958 Interim Report recommended that
Congress enact legislation that would, among other things, regulate union funds and ensure union democracy, S. REP.
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that characterized the operation of many unions. 214 Title IV's provisions safeguard-
ing "free and periodic elections" 2 15 of union officers were crucial to the accomplish-
ment of these purposes because autocratic and entrenched union officers often be-
come corrupt.2 16 Thus, Title IV's goal was "the ending of autocratic rule by placing
the ultimate power in the hands of the members, where it rightfully belongs, so that
they may . . . bring about a regeneration of union leadership" 2 17 which would be
"responsive to the desires of the men and women whom they represent.' 218
'Judge Posner was quite correct, then, in noting that "self-perpetuating in-
cumbency" was one of the "specific dangers . . . the election provisions of the
LMRDA were designed to cure." ' 219 Indeed, the Court in Hotel Employees stressed
that "[c]ontrol by incumbents ... is precisely what Congress legislated against in
the LMRDA. ' '220 Unfortunately, the court's opinion did not evaluate the IEA's
affirmative action plan in light of this congressional intent. 22' An evaluation of this
No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 450 (1958). The legislative history of the LMRDA indicates that the Act was passed in
direct response to the McClellan Committee's recommendations. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong.. 1st Sess. 2
(1959) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OFTHE LABOR-MANAGEtENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 398 (1959) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; H. REP. No. 741,
86th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 759-60. See generally Comment, The
Problem of Union Corruption and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 38 TEx. L. REV. 468
(1960). For more general discussions of union corruption, see Hutchinson, The Anatomy of Corruption in Trade Unions, 8
INDUS. REL. 135 (1969); Weinstein, Racketeering and Labor: An Economic Analysis, 19 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 402
(1966).
214. Organizations like the ACLU, and a number of scholars, most notably Clyde Summers, now of the University
of Pennsylvania Law School, had long been writing about the lack of democracy in the labor movement and the need for
legislation insuring union democracy. See, e.g., ACLU, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS (1943); P. TAFT, THE STRUC-
TURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS (1944); Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs,
44 ILL. L. REV. 425, 431 (1949); Summers, The Public Interest in Union Democracy, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 610 (1958);
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1951). However, it was the McClellan
Committee's documentation of the relationship between union corruption and undemocratic practices in unions that
provided the final impetus for the union democracy provisions of the LMRDA. See J. BELLACE & A. BERKOwrrz. THE
LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT: TWENTY YEARS OF FEDERAL PROTECTION Or UNION MEMBERS' RItrrs 2 (1979). As Senator
McClellan stated during the debates over the LMRDA:
I do not believe that racketeering, corruption, abuse of power, and other improper practices on the part of some
labor organizations can be, or will ever be, prevented until and unless the Congress of the United States has the
wisdom and the courage to enact laws prescribing minimum standards of democratic process and conduct for the
administration of internal union affairs.
105 CONG. REC. 6471 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 213, at 1098.
215. SENATE REPORT, supra note 213, at 6.
216. Some trade unions have acquired bureaucratic tendencies and characteristics. The relationship of the
leaders of such unions to their members have in some instances become impersonal and autocratic. In some
cases men who have acquired positions of power and responsibility within unions have abused their power and
forsaken their responsibilities to the membership and to the public. The power and control of a trade union by
leaders who abuse their power and forsake their responsibilities inevitably leads to the elimination of the
efficient, honest and democratic practices within the union, and often results in irresponsible actions which are
detrimental to the public interest.
H. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 213, at 759-60.
217. 105 CONG. REC. 6472 (1959) (statement of Sen. McClellan), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
213, at 1099.
218. SENATE REPORT, supra note 213, at 20. See Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 309
(1977); Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 497 (1968).
219. 667 F.2d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 1982).
220. 391 U.S. 492, 505 (1968) (emphasis added). See also Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S.
305, 309 (1977) ("Congress chose the goal of 'free and democratic' union elections as a preventive measure 'to curb the
possibility of abuse by benevolent as well as malevolent entrenched leadership."') (quoting Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club
Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 503 (1968)).
221. See supra note 195.
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kind should have led to the conclusion that the IEA's plan was entirely consistent
with Title IV's legislative purpose because the plan did not encourage the develop-
ment of an entrenched incumbency. One hundred percent of the IEA's otherwise
qualified membership was still eligible to run for ninety-two percent of the offices in
question, in great contrast to eligibility rules like those struck down in Hotel Em-
ployees and Steelworkers, which allowed less than ten percent of the unions' mem-
berships to run for 100 percent of the offices in question.22 2 Moreoever, by reserving
a small number of offices for members of groups that had previously been under-
represented in the IEA's governing bodies,2 23 the actual effect of the plan was to
increase, rather than decrease, the pool of candidates for union office, and to in-
crease, rather than decrease, the degree to which the union leadership is responsive to
the concerns of all the union's membership. True, nonminority members of the union
could not seek a small number of the union's offices, but as the Court stated in
Steelworkers, "Title IV is not designed merely to protect the right of a union member
to run for a particular office in a particular election. 'Congress emphatically asserted
a vital public interest in assuring free and democratic union elections that transcends
the narrower interest of the complaining union members.' -
224
3. The Reasonable Qualifications Exception Balancing Test
It is ironic that Judge Posner, who is often critical of governmental regulation of
the private sector,225 gave so little weight to the IEA's own interest in adopting its
affirmative action plan.226 After all, in enacting the LMRDA Congress was guided by
222. See supra text accompanying notes 198-99. However, to the extent the minority add-on delegates to the
representative assembly are selected by the IEA's board of directors, rather than by the IEA's membership directly, the
plan does to some degree increase the ability of incumbent board members to keep themselves in office, thereby violating
both Title Iv's legislative purpose and the letter of § 401(d). See supra text accompanying notes 181-91.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
224. 429 U.S. 305, 309 (1977) (quoting Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 475
(1968)). The Steelworkers court went on to point out that the "'free and democratic' union elections" guaranteed by Title
IV were "modeled on 'political elections in this country."' Id. at 309 (quoting Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees
Union, Local 6,391 U.S. 492,504 (1968)). Cf. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198, 202 (1944) (likening
the functions and duties of unions to those of legislatures). Further support for union affirmative action plans like that of
the IEA may therefore be derived from recent voting rights cases permitting states to use race as a factor in redistricting
and reapportionment. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). See generally Note, Affirmative
Action and Electoral Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1811 (1981). But see Note, Affirmative Action in the Electoral Process: The
Constitutionality of the Democratic Party's Equal Division Rule, 15 U. Micn. J.L. REF. 309 (1982).
225. See, e.g., R. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsis OF LAW 271-84, 328-36 (2d ed. 1977).
226. One might speculate that Judge Posner was relatively quick to interfere with the IEA's election procedures
because he views the conduct of labor unions as state action. See id. at 248, 532. In Judge Posner's view, therefore, it
might not have been strictly the private sector with which the court was interfering. Although Judge Posner is not alone in
arguing that union conduct should be treated as state action, especially in relation to discrimination, see, e.g., Railway
Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 208 (1944)
(Murphy, J., concurring); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); Lang,
Toward a Right to Union Membership, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RExv. 31, 40-49 (1977), the Supreme Court has expressly
rejected this argument in recent cases. E.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983);
United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 117 (1982); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979).
For a critical reexamination of the state action doctrine in the labor law context, see Kare, The PubliclPrivate Distinction
in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358 (1982). In any event, this explanation of Judge Posner's opinion fails because
Posner concedes that the fourteenth amendment is not applicable to the case, 667 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1982), and even
if it were, it is likely the IEA's affirmative action plan would survive fourteenth amendment scrutiny. Cf. Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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the general principles that "unions should be left free to 'operate their own affairs, as
far as possible,'" and that union members "'are fully competent to regulate union
affairs"' 2 27 with only "minimum interference by Government.", 228 Judge Posner
gave particularly short shrift to the fact that the IEA's affirmative action plan was
adopted by a large majority of the "overwhelmingly white" representative
assembly. 229 While the LMRDA does not exclude from its prohibitions otherwise
unlawful practices that are adopted by majority vote,2 30 the adoption of a practice by
a large majority may nevertheless be relevant in determining whether the practice is
in fact unlawful, at least when, as here, that majority was comprised largely of the
purported victims of the unlawful practice.2 3'
In the final analysis, determination of whether the IEA's affirmative action plan
violated section 401(e) of the LMRDA should have turned on the balancing232 of the
union's purposes in adopting the plan, considered in light of the congressional policy
against undue interference with the internal affairs of unions, against the extent to
which the plan actually limited union members' rights to run for office, thereby
increasing the dangers of an entrenched leadership. 3 This was precisely the type of
balancing used by the district court when it upheld the IEA's plan. 234 Unfortunately,
Judge Posner's mistaken application of the per se rule of Steelworkers to the lEA's
plan235 resulted in reversal of the district court's ruling without an adequate demon-
stration that the results of the lower court's balancing were erroneous.
227. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 117 (1982) (quoting S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
4-5 (1958)). See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 213, at 7.
228. SENATE REPORT, supra note 213, at 7. The Supreme Court has emphasized the "long-standing policy against
unnecessary governmental intrusion into internal union affairs," and the "'general congressional policy to allow unions
great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies.' Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S.
463, 471 (1968) (quoting Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964)).
229. 667 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying note 180.
230. See, e.g., LMRDA § 501(a), 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) ("a general exculpatory resolution of a governing body
purporting to relieve a union officer of liability for breach of the [fiduciary] duties declared by this section shall be void as
against public policy").
231. Cf. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHi. L. REv. 723 (1974); Wright,
Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHt. L. REV. 213 (1980) (both arguing that it is not
"suspect" for a majority to discriminate against itself by enacting affirmative action plans benefiting members of minority
groups). In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in which the Court struck down a medical school
affirmative action plan that set aside a certain number of positions in each class for minorities while indicating approval of
university affirmative action plans that take race into account as an admissions criterion, Justice Powell's opinion
implicitly rejected the Ely and Wright approach, id. at 290-94, but Justice Brennan's opinion seemed receptive to it. Id. at
357 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 178
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
232. See Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 147 (C.D. Ill. 1981), rev'd sub nom., Donovan v.
Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982); Note, The Election Labyrinth: An Inquiry into Title IV of the LMRDA,
43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 336, 346 (1968).
233. A Department of Labor regulation interpreting Title IV of the LMRDA provides:
[RIestrictions placed on the right of members to be candidates must be closely scrutinized to determine whether
they serve union purposes of such importance, in terms of protecting the union as an institution, as to justify
subordinating the right of the individual member to seek office and the interest of the membership in a free,
democratic choice of leaders.
29 C.F.R. § 452.35 (1983).
234. See Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 148 (C.D. III. 1981), rev'd sub nor., Donovan v.
Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982); supra text accompanying notes 157-64.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 205-09. When properly applied, the Steelworkers per se rule is not
inconsistent with a more general balancing test for determining whether eligibility requirements for union office violate
§ 401(e). The per se rule applies when a union eligibility rule prevents so many members from running for office-in
Steelworkers 96.5 percent of the membership--that no union purpose behind the rule, no matter how laudable, could
outweigh the resulting interference with the membership's right to choose freely its own leaders.
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In dicta the court of appeals did offer one plausible justification for reversing the
district court: it asserted that the IEA failed to produce sufficient evidence on a
number of important matters such as the benefits to the Association from its affirma-
tive action plan, the justification for the eight percent figure of minority positions,
and the reasons for including Asians and American Indians as beneficiaries of the
plan. 236 The significance of these evidenciary problems, however, depends in large
part on whether the IEA was facing a relatively high or a relatively low "burden of
justification." 2 37 Certainly, as the plaintiff in the litigation, the Department of Labor
had the initial burden of proving a prima facie case. This the Department accom-
plished by demonstrating that nonminority members were barred from running for the
positions reserved for minorities. At that point, the burden shifted to the IEA to prove
what is essentially an affirmative defense-that the restrictions in question fell within
the reasonable qualifications exception. But since it was a balancing test that should
have been used to determine whether the restrictions were reasonable, the IEA should
have had to produce only enough evidence justifying the restrictions to outweigh the
plan's restrictive impact. And since the IEA's eligibility requirements had a relatively
small restrictive impact, especially in comparison to the restrictions in Hotel Em-
ployees and Steelworkers,238 the IEA's "burden of justification" should have been
relatively low. Because the court mistakenly equated the restrictions in lEA with
those in Hotel Employees and Steelworkers, however, it apparently judged the IEA's
evidence against a relatively high burden. It is entirely possible that, had the Seventh
Circuit not confused the facts in lEA with those in Hotel Employees and Steelworkers,
it, like the district court, would have found the IEA's evidence justifying the affirma-
tive action plan to be sufficient.239
4. The Department of Labor Regulations
A further difficulty with the court's opinion in lEA is its failure to utilize the
Department of Labor's own interpretive guidelines in construing the reasonable quali-
fications exception. While the Department's regulations are not binding on the
courts, they are entitled to great deference, 240 and Judge Posner's disregard of them is
surprising since they were explicitly relied upon by both the district CoUrt24 ' and the
IEA.242
236. 667 F.2d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1982).
237. Id. at 641.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 205-09.
239. Furthermore, regardless of whether the IEA's evidence should have been measured against a high or a low
standard, it is significant that the dispute over the IEA's affirmative action plan arose as an interlocutory matter decided on
briefs and affidavits only, without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. 667 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1982). If the Seventh
Circuit felt the IEA's "two perfunctory affidavits" were insufficient, id. at 641, it would have been more appropriate,
especially since this was a case of first impression, for the court to remand the matter to the district court for further fact
finding, rather than to decide the merits of the dispute on an inadequate record. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 277 (1965); Kristinus v. H. Stem Co., 615 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1980); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Lucy Prods. Co., 403 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1968).
240. See Marshall v. Local Lodge 1784, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 509 F. Supp. 90, 95 (D. Md. 1981). Cf.
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980); Marshall v. N. L. Indus., 618 F.2d 1220, 1224 (7th Cir. 1980).
241. Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n. 511 F. Supp. 144, 147-58 (C.D. 11. 1981).
242. Brief for Appellee at 38-43, Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982). The IEA argued
not only that its affirmative action plan was consistent with the Department of Labor interpretive guidelines, but also that
the Department's challenge to the plan, in the face of guidelines seemingly permitting the plan, was arbitrary. Id. at 38.
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The regulations begin by acknowledging that "whether a qualification is reason-
able is a matter which is not susceptible of precise definition, and will ordinarily turn
on the facts in each case.' '243 The guidelines do, however, identify a number of
general factors that the courts can consider in resolving this question. One is "[t]he
relationship of the qualification to the legitimate needs and interests of the union." 2'
The IEA adopted its affirmative action plan for several reasons, among which were
(1) to provide "a continuing and effective vehicle for consideration of minority
information and views in its policies and programs; ' 245 (2) to enable the IEA to
organize more effectively potential members "among communities served by minor-
ity teachers or containing a large minority school population;" '2 4 6 (3) "to encourage
and keep minority members active in leadership positions; ' 247 and (4) to help the
IEA "become a body that was representative of all its members and of greater service
to minority students.' 248 While reasonable persons may differ on whether the IEA's
affirmative action plan was the most appropriate means of achieving these goals,
most would probably agree that these are legitimate union goals, and that the affirma-
tive action plan was indeed a closely related means of achieving them.
24 9
Another consideration mentioned in the Department's regulations interpreting
the reasonable qualifications exception is "[t]he relationship of the qualification to
the demands of union office.' 25 Since representing the interests of minorities is only
a small part of the duties of delegates to the representative assembly or members of
the board of directors, it would be inappropriate-and illegal-to require all such
positions to be held by members of minority groups. However, since the eight percent
of these positions set aside for minorities was designed at least in part to help carry
out the four purposes identified above, a close relationship exists between those
duties and the requirement that the officials be members of the designated minority
groups.2 51
Indeed, it is somewhat curious that the Department of Labor under the Carter administration, which was generally
favorably disposed towards affirmative action, undertook this challenge to the IEA's affirmative action plan in the first
place. Apparently, the decision to proceed was made within the Department's Labor Management Services Administra-
tion without consultation with the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department. However, when during the early days
of the Reagan administration, the decision to appeal the district court's decision was made, holdovers from the Caner
administration in the Civil Rights Division learned of the case and argued strenuously against the appeal. Although they
lost that argument, they may have succeeded in preventing the case from being used as a vehicle for the type of
broad-based attacks on affirmative action later brought by the Reagan administration. See supra note 24. Telephone
interview with Department of Labor attorney who asked not to be identified (Oct. 6, 1983).
243. 29 C.F.R. § 452.36(a) (1983).
244. Id. § 452.36(b)(1).
245. Weaver Affidavit, supra note 7, at 4. As another lEA official put it, the affirmative action plan was designed to
enable "the minority point of view ... to be stated within the IEA by minority teachers and members themselves."
Affidavit of Antoinette Minuzzo at 2, reprinted in Brief for Appellee, Appendix, Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667
F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
246. Weaver Affidavit, supra note 7, at 4. This purpose of the plan may have particular significance since the
National Education Association's chief rival, the American Federation of Teachers, has taken a public stand against
affirmative action. See supra note 81.
247. Affidavit of Antoinette Minuzzo at 2, reprinted in Brief for Appellee, Appendix, Donovan v. Illinois Educ.
Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
248. Id.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 57-112.
250. 29 C.F.R. § 452.36(b)(2) (1983).
251. This is not to suggest that no white officials could fully and fairly represent the IEA's minority members, or that
all minorities could do so. It is simply that minority officials are more likely to represent the interests of minorities within
the IEA more effectively than white officials. See supra text accompanying notes 57-69.
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A third consideration identified in the guidelines is "[tihe impact of the quali-
fication, in light of the Congressional purpose of fostering the broadest possible
participation in union affairs."- 252 The IEA's affirmative action plan fully meets this
consideration. The plan in no way restricted the rights of nonminorities to run for the
same offices for which they were eligible before the plan was implemented, and it
enabled previously underrepresented groups within the IEA to participate more fully
than before in the union's government.
253
In addition to the general considerations just discussed,254 the Department's
regulations include several more specific provisions that have some bearing on the
lEA case. For example, the interpretive guidelines provide that a union "may not
limit eligibility for office to particular branches or segments of the union where such
restriction has the effect of depriving those members who are not in such branch or
segment of the right to become officers of the union." 255 This provision would seem
to mean that a union may limit eligibility for some offices to particular segments of
the union if members not in those segments can also become officers.25 6 That is
precisely how the IEA's affirmative action plan operates: only minorities can run for
252. 29 C.F.R. § 452.36(b)(3) (1983).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
254. The interpretive guidelines mention two more general considerations that are less directly relevant to the IEA's
affirmative action plan. One calls for "[a] comparison of the particular qualification with the requirements for holding
office generally prescribed by other labor organizations." 29 C.F.R. § 452.36(b)(4) (1983). The IEA's plan fails this test
because very few other unions have reserved elective positions for members of minority groups. See supra text
accompanying notes 113-28. This consideration should be given little weight, however. The LMRDA was not enacted to
canonize some union practices just because they are popular, or to prohibit others just because they are unusual. Each
union practice should be evaluated on its own merits in light of the LMRDA's purposes, and unions should be free to
experiment with new approaches to their own self-government so long as they do not undermine those purposes. As the
Senate Committee report on the LMRDA stated:
[1In establishing and enforcing statutory standards great care should be taken not to undermine union
self-government.... The Committee strongly opposes any attempt to prescribe detailed procedures and stan-
dards for the conduct of union business. Such paternalistic regulation would weaken rather than strengthen the
labor movement; it would cross over into the area of trade union licensing and destroy union independence.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 213, at 7.
The last general consideration included in the Department of Labor guidelines is "[tlhe degree of difficulty in
meeting a qualification by union members." 29 C.F.R. § 452.36(b)(5) (1983). Minority members of the lEA, of course,
had no difficulty meeting the eligibility requirements for the positions reserved for minorities, while nonminority members
of the IEA by definition found it impossible to meet those requirements. However, since nonminority members were still
eligible to run for the 92% of the positions not set aside for minorities, and since the positions for which they were eligible
were in all respects, other than the means of selection, identical to the remaining eight percent, see supra text accompany-
ing note 207, this consideration does not appear to require the court's result in lEA.
255. 29 C.F.R. § 452.42 (1983).
256. Indeed, this seems to be the position of the court in a case cited in the regulation itself. In Hodgson v. Local
610, United Elec. Workers, 342 F. Supp. 1344 (W.D. Pa. 1972), the union represented employees in two geographically
separated divisions of one company. To guarantee the employees in the much smaller of the two divisions some
representation within the union's elected leadership, the union constitution provided that only employees of the larger
division could be president or secretary-treasurer and that only employees of the smaller division could be vice-president
or recording secretary. Although it held that this arrangement violated § 401(e) of the LMRDA, the court stated that
[t]he end sought to be achieved by the provision, i.e., the insured representation ... of a minority group within
the membership ... is laudable .... The defendant argues ... that to insure the fair representation of its
members who are employed by [the smaller division] the constitution must mandate the election of certain
officers from their number. With this I agree ...
The difficulty with the amendment is its inflexibility. There is no apparent need to prescribe the precise
offices for which those of each of the groups of the defendant's members are eligible. The end sought could be
as easily and as effectively achieved by providing simply, for instance, that the president and vice-president may
not be from the same group.
Id. at 1347-48 (emphasis added).
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some of the representative assembly and board of director positions, but nonminori-
ties are still eligible to hold the rest.
257
The final interpretive guideline relevant to the IEA's affirmative action plan
states that "[w]here personal characteristics have a direct bearing on fitness for
office, a labor organization may establish certain restrictions on the right to be a
candidate." 258 As with the Department's general admonition to consider the relation-
ship between the challenged qualification and the demands of the office, 259 a candi-
date's minority status has a direct bearing on his or her ability to represent the
interests of the IEA's minority members, which is one of the reasons these positions
were reserved for minorities to begin with.2 60 But the regulation contains a key
proviso:
A union may not, however, establish such rules if they would be inconsistent with any
other Federal law. Thus, it ordinarily may not limit eligibility for office to persons of any
particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin since this would be inconsistent
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.261
Although Judge Posner did not cite this provision in his opinion, he apparently had its
thrust in mind since he cited as "in accord" with his decision262 Schultz v. Local
1291, International Longshoremen's Association, 263 a 1972 decision cited by the
Department of Labor in support of its proviso. 264 Whether the IEA's affirmative
action plan is consistent with this proviso depends on whether Longshoremen can be
distinguished.
5. The Longshoremen Decision
Longshoremen is the only case decided under section 401 of the LMRDA be-
sides lEA that directly confronted racially based qualifications for union office. In
Longshoremen the defendant union's bylaws allocated all union offices on racial
grounds. The president, financial secretary, half the business agents and sergeants-at-
arms, and two of three trustees were all to be black, and the vice-president, recording
secretary, and remaining business agents, sergeants-at-arms, and trustees were all to
be white. 265 The union attempted to justify the arrangement as necessary following
257. Similarly, another guideline permits unions to reserve certain offices for representatives "of a unit defined on a
geographic, craft, shift, or similar basis," so long as the offices set aside for special groups are not "general officers such
as the president, vice-president, recording secretary, financial secretary, and treasurer." 29 C.F.R. § 452.43 (1983)
(emphasis added). If special representation along racial or ethnic lines can be considered a "similar basis," the IEA's
affirmative action plan seems to fit neatly within this provision. The guideline does add, however, a further proviso: "If
eligibility of delegates to a convention which will elect general officers is limited to special categories of members, all
such categories within the organization must be represented." Id. Since only eight percent of the IEA's delegate positions
are reserved for "special categories of members," and all other categories of members are eligible to run for the remaining
positions, the proviso does not appear to bar the IEA's plan.
258. Id. § 452.46.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 250-51.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 245-51.
261. 29 C.F.R. § 452.46 (1983).
262. 667 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1982).
263. 338 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Pa.), affd per curiam sub nom. Hodgson v. Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1262 (3d Cir. 1972).
264. See 29 C.F.R. § 452.46 at n.28 (1983).
265. 338 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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the merger of two segregated locals to prevent the union, which had a membership
half white and half black, from "slip[ping] into a segregated status."- 26 6 The court
rejected this argument and gave several reasons for finding the union's bylaws in
violation of section 401(e). First, the bylaws completely barred members who were
neither black nor white, such as Polynesians, from holding union office. Second, the
rule was "of infinite duration," which permanently precluded whites from holding
the positions reserved for blacks and vice versa. Third, "the major difficulty" with
the rule was the lack of an "objective relationship between the eligibility quali-
fications and the duties of the office involved." Last, and most significant for pur-
poses of the Department's reliance on the case, the union bylaw "amount[ed] to an
unlawful employment practice within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) [Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964].,,267
None of these reasons is persuasive when applied to the IEA's affirmative action
plan. First, the IEA plan does not bar any otherwise eligible member from running for
any elective office. 268 Second, the IEA's plan-at least that part dealing with the
election of minority add-on delegates to the representative assembly-is temporary in
nature,269 and no nonminorities are barred, permanently or otherwise, from holding
any of the IEA offices. 270 Third, as argued earlier, a definite relationship exists
between the functions of the IEA positions reserved for minorities and the require-
ment that those positions be held by members of minority groups. 27 1 Last, the
Longshoremen interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may'no longer be good
law since both that decision and the proviso based on it predate the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber.272 In Weber the Court upheld a
voluntary affirmative action plan that reserved for blacks fifty percent of the openings
in an in-plant job training program against a challenge under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.273 If the IEA's plan is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Weber, it should survive scrutiny under the Department's proviso.
6. The Weber Decision
Perhaps the single most surprising aspect of Judge Posner's opinion in lEA is its
complete failure to discuss Weber or the other recent Supreme Court cases dealing
with affirmative action. 274 This is particularly remarkable because of lEA's status as
the first, and to date only, post-Weber appellate court decision finding an affirmative
266. Id. at 1207.
267. Id. at 1206-08.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 207-08.
269. See supra note 162.
270. Id.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 250-51.
272. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
273. See infra text accompanying notes 280-83.
274. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Given his long-standing opposition to affirmative action, see supra note 23, the fact that Judge Posner ignored these recent
decisions and "reached back into the ... past" for the Longshoremen precedent would seem to open him up to the same
criticism that in another context he leveled at "judicial activists"-judges who, according to Posner, "dis-
regard... precedents . . . to change the law to make it conform to their own views of public policy." Landes & Posner,
Legal Precedents: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. L. & ECON. 249, 274 (1976).
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action plan violative of federal law.2 75 Judge Posner may be correct, of course, that
"the status of affirmative action under civil rights statutes or the equal protection
clause" was not directly involved in the lEA litigation. 276 However, the reference to
Title VII in the Department of Labor's regulations construing the reasonable quali-
fications exception277 and Judge Posner's citation of the Longshoremen case, which
in turn cites Title VII, 278 demonstrate that Weber should have been considered.
Moreover, a basic principle of statutory construction in labor law is to treat all the
federal labor statutes as an integrated whole embodying a comprehensive and coor-
dinated federal labor policy, not as isolated and unrelated sources of law. 2 79 There-
fore, if the policies behind Title VII of the Civil Rights Act permit voluntary affirma-
tive action in the employment context, a court should at least consider those same
policies in determining whether the Landrum-Griffin Act permits voluntary affirma-
tive action in the context of union government.
In Weber the United Steelworkers and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical
Corporation had voluntarily negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that in-
cluded an affirmative action plan aimed at integrating Kaiser's then "almost ex-
clusively white" force of skilled craftworkers. 280 Pursuant to the plan, on-the-job
training programs were set up to enable unskilled production workers to obtain the
skills necessary to qualify for craft positions. Applicants were chosen on the basis of
seniority, except that fifty percent of the openings in the training programs were
reserved for blacks. 281 The plan was challenged in a class action brought under Title
VII by a white employee who was denied admission to the training program despite
having greater seniority than the black workers chosen. 282 The Supreme Court re-
jected the claim holding that Title VII "left employers and unions in the private
sector free to take such race-conscious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories.' '283
In reaching that conclusion, the Court declined to "define in detail the line of
demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans.' 284 It
did, however, identify a number of features of the defendant's plan that "mirror[ed
the purposes] of the statute" and thereby placed it "on the permissible side of the
line.' 285 For example, both the plan and Title VII "were designed to break down old
275. See supra note 20.
276. 667 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1982).
277. 29 C.F.R. § 452.46 (1983).
278. 338 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
279. See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970); Scofield v. NLRB, 394
U.S. 423, 429-30 (1969); NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 291-92 (1960); Helton v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 883,
895-96 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Local 32, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 195 N.L.R.B. 1, 2 (1972).
280. 443 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1979). The affirmative action plan was adopted voluntarily in the sense that the parties
were subject to no court order or statutory obligation to do so. The parties did argue to the Court, however, that they
adopted the plan at least in part because they feared a Title VII suit would be brought against them by black employees if
they did not. Nevertheless, for purposes of its decision, the Court treated the plan as completely voluntary. Id. at 209 n.9.
281. Id. at 198, 199. At the particular plant in question, blacks held only 1.83% of the craftworkjobs, but comprised
39% of the work force in the surrounding area. Id. at 198-99.
282. Id. at 199.
283. Id. at 197.
284. Id. at 208.
285. Id. See also La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1982); Comment, Voluntary Affirmative
Action Under Title VII: Standards of Permissibility, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 281, 298-99 (1980).
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patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy [and] to 'open employment opportunities
for Negroes in occupations which have traditionally been closed to them.' -286
Moreover, the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white em-
ployees"; it neither required the discharge of white workers nor created "an absolute
bar to [their] advancement.' 287 Finally, the plan was a temporary measure designed
not to guarantee permanent racial balance but to eliminate a present racial im-
balance.288
Undoubtedly, unions can devise affirmative action plans in the analogous con-
text of union government that satisfy these criteria, and indeed, the Illinois Education
Association's plan came very close to doing so. The IEA's plan, for example, was
designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation in the union's government
and open up leadership opportunities for minorities in offices that had traditionally
been closed to them. 289 In addition, by creating new positions for minorities rather
than reallocating already existing offices, the IEA's plan did not require the removal
from office of any nonminority officials and did not create an absolute bar to their
advancement. The plan thereby avoided any unnecessary trammeling of the rights of
the union's nonminority members.
Unfortunately, the IEA's plan only partially satisfied Weber's third criterion-
that it be only a temporary measure. The provisions creating the minority add-on
delegates to the representative assembly did meet this requirement since recourse to
add-on delegates was necessary only so long as the ordinary election procedures
continued to yield a racially imbalanced result.290 The minority positions on the
IEA's board of directors, on the other hand, appear to have been permanent additions
which would have remained in place even if the eight percent goal were met without
them. 29' To the extent that this permanent arrangement ran afoul of the Weber
criteria, however, the difficulty could have been avoided by having the minority slots
on the board of directors operate like the add-on delegates to the representative
assembly. In the alternative, the IEA could have simply placed a reasonable termina-
tion date on the plan, at which time the special minority seats would be eliminated
unless upon reevaluation it were determined that a racial imbalance remained that
required the renewal of the plan for another fixed term.
Two additional aspects of the Weber decision have some bearing on the IEA's
plan and Judge Posner's opinion in lEA. First, the Weber Court treated Kaiser's
affirmative action plan simply as an attempt to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance
in traditionally segregated positions and not necessarily as a plan designed to remedy
286. 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey)).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 208-09.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 1-12. Several post-Weber decisions have held that while statistical im-
balances alone may not necessarily establish unlawful discrimination, they may be relied on to justify affirmative action.
E.g., Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962 (8th
Cir. 1981).
290. See supra note 162.
291. Indeed, in 1980 the IEA's board of directors was 15% minority. See supra text accompanying note 7. The eight
percent goal could have been met by filling only one of the four special minority slots, in light of the number of minority
group members who obtained seats on the beard of directors through ordinary means.
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past discrimination by Kaiser or the Steelworkers.2 92 Thus, Judge Posner's concern
in lEA that the record revealed no evidence of past discrimination on the part of the
IEA2 9 3 is misguided, particularly in light of the long and well-documented history of
racial discrimination in the nation's school systems--discrimination against not only
minority students but minority teachers as well.294 Second, the Court invoked the
"'familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.'"295
By increasing the opportunities for previously underrepresented union members to
hold union office while imposing no significant disadvantages on its other members,
the LEA's plan surely comports with the intentions of the LMRDA's makers.296
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, the Seventh Circuit's decision in lEA was half right, but for the
wrong reasons. The court was correct in ruling that the IEA's plan as adopted in 1974
violated the Landrum-Griffin Act, but the court was wrong about the nature of the
violation. By relying on section 401(e) of the Act instead of section 401(d) and by
following the Steelworkers and Hotel Employees cases in a too literalistic fashion, the
court issued an overbroad opinion that would seem to prohibit virtually any union
efforts to assure minority or women members minimal representation in elective
union office. The violations actually contained in the IEA's plan could have been
remedied with some relatively minor modifications that would have left the heart of
the plan intact. 2 97 Nothing in the Landrum-Griffin Act would prohibit carefully
designed affirmative action plans along the lines of that adopted by the IEA. On the
contrary, when these plans result in increased opportunities for greater numbers of the
rank and file to hold union office, as the IEA's plan did, they actually further the
Act's purposes.
292. 443 U.S. 193, 208, 209 nn.8 & 9 (1979). Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion argued that voluntary
affirmative action plans should be permitted under Title VII only when the party adopting the plan had in the past
committed an "arguable violation" of the Act which the plan is designed to remedy. Id. at 211 (Blackmun. J.,
concurring). Justice Blackmun conceded, however, that in practice his approach would operate little differently than the
majority's. Id. at 213. In any event, in the context of union government, the arguable violation approach would often
simply not be applicable. Minorities and women may have been excluded from certain types of work in the past because of
discrimination by employers which was beyond the control of a particular union. Nevertheless, the continuing effects of
that discrimination may result in the underrepresentation of minorities and women in union office. For example, minorit-
ies and women would tend to have less seniority or hold lower status positions, making it more difficult for them to get
elected to office. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03. In such a case, it would obviously be impossible for the
guilty employer to remedy within the union these consequences of its own past discrimination. Only the union is in a
position to do so, and unless it is permitted to take remedial action, even absent "arguable violations" on its own part,
such consequences of past discrimination would be impossible to remedy.
293. 667 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1982).
294. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971); United States v. Montgom-
ery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225,231-35 (1969); Brown v. Board ofEduc., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (Brown
II); Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1983); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981). See generally
Davidson, Davidson & Howard, The R(ifng of Brown: De-Integrating Public School Faculties, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 443 (1982). See also Cohen v. Community College, 484 F. Supp. 411, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("lUInder Weber-
.... affirmative action ... can be justified by the existence of a history of racial discrimination in the relevant
occupation or profession at large.")
295. 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 210-24.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 190 & 291.
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This Article, on the other hand, was not intended to suggest that the Landrum-
Griffin Act requires unions to adopt affirmative action plans. Given a labor move-
ment that for the most part considers quotas, goals, and preferential treatment as
"anathema," '2 98 expectations that affirmative action in union government will be-
come the norm rather than the exception are unrealistic. Nevertheless, compelling
reasons why many unions might seek to remedy the underrepresentation of minorities
and women in union office do exist. A union can better represent its minority and
female members and can improve the quality of union leadership in general by
increasing the total pool of leadership talent. Having more minority and women
officers can also help unions organize minority and women workers more effectively,
avoid liability in employment discrimination suits, and preserve labor peace by
reducing the likelihood of wildcat strikes. When unions do decide to adopt affirma-
tive action plans providing minorities and women with increased representation in
union government, neither the courts nor the Department of Labor should stand in
their way because of a misplaced reliance on the lEA decision.
298. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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